伊姆兰·哈利德是常驻卡拉奇的地缘战略分析师，也是美国智库“外交政策聚焦”的高级研究员。
Imran Khalid is a Karachi-based geostrategic analyst and a senior fellow at Foreign Policy In Focus, a U.S. think tank.
两年来，胡塞武装将其导弹行动包装为对加沙的声援，这为其提供了政治庇护。上周，总部位于麦加的非政府组织“世界穆斯林联盟”称其最近的袭击是“背信弃义的恐怖袭击”。10月6日和7日发射至沙特阿拉伯利雅得和艾卜哈机场的胡塞导弹造成3人死亡、36人受伤。10月10日星期六，一枚导弹击中了沙特首都哈立德国王国际机场的客运航站楼，造成12人死亡、309人受伤，该航站楼次日再次遭到袭击。科威特称这些袭击是对沙特主权的粗暴践踏。埃及表示，这些袭击威胁到了整个地区。
For two years, the Houthis presented their missile campaign as solidarity with Gaza, and this shielded them politically. Last week the Muslim World League, a Mecca-based NGO, called their latest strikes "treacherous terrorist attacks." Houthi missiles fired on 6 and 7 October at Saudi Arabia's airports in Riyadh and Abha killed three people and wounded 36. On Saturday, Oct. 10, a missile struck a passenger terminal at King Khalid International Airport in the Saudi capital, killing 12 people and injuring 309, and the terminal was hit again the next day. Kuwait called the attacks a flagrant violation of Saudi sovereignty. Egypt said they threatened the whole region.
9月夺取也门红海海岸后，胡塞武装失去了其政治掩护。从山区向外开火的民兵可以为自己披上某种崇高事业的外衣。而一个占领了穆恰、丕林岛以及曼德海峡沿岸的运动则是一个与邻国穆斯林处于战争状态的领土政权，它现在必须为此承担责任。
The Houthis forfeited their political cover when they took Yemen's Red Sea coast in September. A militia firing from the mountains could present itself as a cause. A movement occupying Mocha, Perim Island and the coast along the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is a territorial power at war with its Muslim neighbors, and it now has to answer for that.
战场只能展现其中的一部分。也门政府表示，其已收复穆恰和杜巴布，并于10月8日声称有1860名胡塞武装人员被“消灭”。胡塞武装军事发言人叶海亚·萨里对此类说法不屑一顾，称其为“虚构的英雄主义”，并且该组织在客运航班计划降落前几分钟向亚丁机场发射了导弹。双方的数据均未得到独立证实。
The battlefield shows only part of this. Yemen's government says it has retaken Mocha and Dhubab, and on Oct. 8 it claimed 1,860 Houthi fighters had been "neutralized." The Houthi military spokesman, Yahya Saree, dismissed the claims as "imaginary heroism," and the group fired missiles at Aden's airport minutes before a passenger flight was due to land. Neither side's figures have been independently confirmed.
政治立场的变化则更加清晰。9月，利雅得表示拦截了一架旨在袭击麦加的胡塞无人机。萨勒曼国王称胡塞武装为“恐怖民兵”，并将此次企图定性为“滔天罪行”。该组织领导人阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞则称这一指控为“弥天大谎”。两年前，他本无需如此激烈地进行这种否认。
The political ground has moved more clearly. In September, Riyadh said it had intercepted a Houthi drone aimed at Mecca. King Salman called the Houthis a "terrorist militia" and the attempt a "heinous crime." Their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, called the accusation "a heinous lie." Two years ago, he would not have needed to be so vehement in such a denial.
麦加协定将这些变化转化为联盟。10月5日，沙特阿拉伯、土耳其和巴基斯坦启动了该联盟，并同意部署土耳其和巴基斯坦军队进入该王国。该设计在政治层面上与军事层面同样重要。巴基斯坦国防部长霍贾·阿西夫表示，他们的军队正“发挥支援作用”，而沙特军队正在进行战斗。土耳其外长哈坎·菲丹于10月8日表示：“这不是一项进攻协议。”安卡拉正将该协定提交议会批准。
The Mecca pact turned these shifts into an alliance. On Oct. 5, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan activated the alliance and agreed to deploy Turkish and Pakistani forces to the kingdom. The design is political as much as military. Pakistan's defense minister, Khawaja Asif, said their forces were "playing a supporting role" and that Saudi troops were doing the fighting. Turkey's foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, said on Oct. 8, "This is not an attack agreement." Ankara is sending the pact to parliament for ratification.
两国政府一直将军队留在也门境外，因此双方都不会被指控入侵另一个穆斯林国家。他们正在保卫两座圣寺的守护者，以对抗利雅得称其曾向其中一座圣寺发射无人机的民兵组织。
Both governments have kept their troops off Yemeni soil, so neither can be accused of invading another Muslim country. They are defending the custodian of the two holiest mosques against a militia that Riyadh says fired a drone at one of them.
此前一直护航船只穿越红海的西方海军自2023年以来从未具备这种常态。华盛顿已经注意到这一点。被问及这些部署时，美国总统特朗普表示：“我认为这很好。”美国还取消了原定于9月20日对胡塞武装的计划打击，现在正让一个穆斯林联盟来完成这项任务。
The Western navies that had escorted ships through the Red Sea from 2023 never had that kind of standing. Washington has noticed. Asked about the deployments, U.S. President Donald Trump said: "I think that's great." The U.S. also called off planned strikes on the Houthis on Sept. 20 and is now letting a Muslim coalition do the job.
2024年4月2日，从巴布·曼德布海峡看到也门一个村庄的景象。
A view of a village in Yemen, as seen from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on April 2.
更棘手的问题是，这个联盟到底在为何而战。也门总统领导委员会领导人拉沙德·阿拉米表示，该行动旨在收复胡塞武装控制的全部领土，包括首都萨那。也门联合国大使告诉联合国也门问题特使汉斯·格伦伯格，政府希望战争得到永久结束，而不仅是另一次停火。收复萨那比收复一个沿海城镇艰巨得多。沙特阿拉伯曾在2015年至2022年间尝试过此举，但最终转而与胡塞武展开谈判。
The harder question is what the coalition is fighting for. The leader of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, says the campaign aims to retake all Houthi-held territory, including the capital of Sanaa. Yemen's United Nations ambassador told the U.N.'s special envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, that the government wants a permanent end to the war, not another truce. Taking Sanaa is a much larger task than retaking a coastal town. The Saudis tried from 2015 to 2022 and ended up negotiating with the Houthis instead.
这些决定将在联合国安理会做出。一个负责也门制裁的专家小组本应在10月15日提交报告，而制裁机制将于11月14日到期。胡塞武装扣押了73名联合国员工。在安理会上，俄罗斯和中国一直避免单独指责胡塞武装，并希望任何解决方案都能将他们包括在内。英国、法国和美国则希望对胡塞武装和伊朗施加更多压力。
The decisions will be made at the U.N. Security Council. A panel of experts on Yemen sanctions was due to report on Oct. 15, and the sanctions regime expires on Nov. 14. The Houthis are holding 73 U.N. staff. On the Security Council, Russia and China have avoided blaming the Houthis alone and want any settlement to include them. Britain, France and the U.S. want more pressure on the Houthis and on Iran.
亚洲各国政府迄今为止将这场争端交给了其他人。这是一个错误，因为安理会面前的问题具有政治性质：一个通过武力夺取海岸线的运动是否应该通过对其所控制地区的承认来得到回报。
Asian governments have so far left this argument to others. This is a mistake, because the question in front of the Security Council is political: whether a movement that seized a coastline by force should be rewarded with recognition of what it holds.
巴基斯坦是个例外，它在两个战场都发挥着作用。它目前在安理会拥有一个席位，并属于保卫利雅得的联盟。其联合国特使阿西姆·伊夫蒂哈尔·艾哈迈德9月在安理会上表示，沙特阿拉伯拥有采取“一切必要措施”保卫自身的“正义权力”。他还呼吁展开由也门人主导的联合国框架下的政治进程，并释放被扣押的联合国员工。伊斯兰堡在支持利雅得自卫权的同时，也支持联合国主导的会谈。亚洲在安理会需要这种组合。
Pakistan is the exception, and it has a role in both arenas. It currently holds a seat on the Security Council and belongs to the alliance defending Riyadh. Its U.N. envoy, Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, told the Security Council in September that Saudi Arabia had a "legitimate right to take all necessary measures" to defend itself. He also called for a Yemeni-led political process under the U.N. and for the release of detained U.N. staff. Islamabad backs Riyadh's right to defend itself and the U.N.-led talks at the same time. Asia needs that combination at the Security Council.
中国的立场更难揣摩。北京在安理会的方针是克制与包容，而《首尔经济日报》报道称，胡塞武装的无人机越来越依赖中国的两用零部件。北京在利雅得和德黑兰也拥有任何西方大国都不具备的崇高地位，因为它在2023年斡旋了两国的和解。它不能一方面在联合国庇护向其中一方发射导弹的民兵，另一方面又把自己表现为两国的斡旋者。
China's position is harder to read. Beijing's Security Council line is restraint and inclusion, and the Seoul Economic Daily reports that Houthi drones increasingly rely on Chinese dual-use components. Beijing also has standing in Riyadh and Tehran that no Western power has, since it brokered their reconciliation in 2023. It cannot present itself as the broker between the two while shielding at the U.N. the militia that is firing missiles at one of them.
亚洲政府应当主张的条款很容易说明白。胡塞武装可以在萨那有谈判席位，但他们不能保留用武力夺取的海岸线。在11月重新实施制裁，并对无人机零部件供应商实施武器禁运，这就是安理会让他们遵守这一原则的方式。东京、首尔和新德里应在投票前公开表明这一立场，北京也应被问及是否同意。
The terms Asian governments should press for are simple to state. The Houthis can have a seat at negotiations in Sanaa, but they cannot keep a coastline taken by force. Renewing the sanctions in November, with the arms embargo enforced against suppliers of drone parts, is how the Security Council can hold them to that. Tokyo, Seoul and New Delhi should say so publicly before the vote, and Beijing should be asked whether it agrees.
通过夺取海岸线，胡塞武装把他们的争端从以色列和美国转向了穆斯林世界，而穆斯林国家正共同作出回应。胡塞武装是否会被削减为仅在萨那谈判的一方，还是继续作为控制海峡的武装运动存在，将在11月的安理会上得到决定。
By taking the coast, the Houthis made their quarrel with the Muslim world instead of with Israel and the U.S., and the Muslim states are answering together. Whether the Houthis are reduced to a party negotiating over Sanaa, or remain an armed movement holding a strait, will be decided at the Security Council in November.