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中期选举前情绪低落、政治忠诚度转变:2026年美国价值观调查结果Darkening Mood and Shifting Political Loyalties Ahead of Midterm Elections: Findings from the 2026 American Values Survey

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执行摘要 美国人对国家发展方向的悲观情绪加剧。超过七成美国人认为国家(71%)和经济(76%)正朝着错误的方向发展,分别较2025年的62%和65%有所上升。

Executive Summary Americans have grown more pessimistic about the country’s direction. Over seven in ten Americans say the country (71%) and the economy (76%) are headed in the wrong direction, up from 62% and 65%, respectively, in 2025.

共和党人的悲观情绪大幅加剧,目前有43%认为国家走上了歧途,高于去年的24%;52%认为经济发展方向错误,较去年的29%发生剧变。

Republicans have grown far more pessimistic, with 43% now saying the country is on the wrong track, up from 24% last year, and 52% saying the economy is going in the wrong direction, a dramatic shift from 29% last year.

多数美国人认同“特朗普总统是一位潜在的危险独裁者,应在其摧毁美国民主前限制其权力”(58%),较2025年3月的52%上升;相比之下,37%认同“特朗普总统是一位强有力的领导人,应赋予其恢复美国伟大所需的权力”。绝大多数民主党人(90%,较3月的87%上升)认同特朗普是危险独裁者,而大多数共和党人认同特朗普是强有力的领导人(77%,较3月的81%略有下降)。认同特朗普是危险独裁者的无党派人士比例自3月以来增加了8个百分点,从56%增至64%。

A majority of Americans agree “President Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy” (58%), up from 52% in March 2025, compared with 37% who agree “President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America’s greatness.”Most Democrats (90%, up from 87% in March) agree that Trump is a dangerous dictator and most Republicans agree that Trump is a strong leader (77%, slightly down from 81% in March). The proportion of independents who agree that Trump is a dangerous dictator has increased by 8 percentage points since March, from 56% to 64%.

进入中期选举阶段,民主党拥有明显的热情优势,反对唐纳德·特朗普总统的动力远强于支持他的动力。

Heading into the midterms, Democrats hold a clear enthusiasm advantage, and opposition to President Donald Trump is a far stronger motivator than support for him.

民主党选民表示对11月投票“非常兴奋”的比例显著高于共和党选民(46% 对 31%)。

Democratic voters are significantly more likely than Republican voters to say they are very excited about voting in November (46% vs. 31%).

三分之二的民主党人(68%)表示反对特朗普的议程是关键议题,而仅有32%的共和党人认为支持其议程同样关键。无党派人士认为反对特朗普议程关键的可能性(38%)是认为支持其议程关键可能性(17%)的两倍多。

Two-thirds of Democrats (68%) say opposing Trump’s agenda is a critical issue, while just 32% of Republicans say the same about supporting it. Independents are more than twice as likely to say opposing Trump’s agenda is critical (38%) as supporting it (17%).

推动特朗普2024年获胜的选民联盟正在瓦解,有色人种选民和年轻选民更倾向于支持民主党国会候选人。

The coalition that powered Trump’s 2024 victory is weakening, as voters of color and younger voters favor Democratic congressional candidates.

特朗普在2024年于历史上支持民主党的群体中取得的显著进展,似乎并不反映持久的政治重组。在计划参加中期选举的已登记选民中,黑人选民以较大优势支持民主党国会候选人(69% 对 8%),西班牙裔选民也是如此(48% 对 26%)。

The notable gains Trump made in 2024 among groups that have historically backed Democrats do not appear to reflect a lasting realignment. Among registered voters who plan to vote in the midterms, Black voters favor the Democratic congressional candidate by a wide margin (69% vs. 8%), as do Hispanic voters (48% vs. 26%).

年轻男性选民同样倾向民主党。18至29岁的年轻男性以10个百分点的优势支持民主党候选人(42% 对 32%),年轻女性的优势则为27个百分点(53% 对 26%)。

Young male voters also favor Democrats. Young men ages 18–29 favor the Democratic candidate by 10 points (42% vs. 32%), and young women by 27 points (53% vs. 26%).

白人选民仍倾向共和党(44% 对 36%),这主要由无大学学历的白人选民驱动(49% 对 27%)。拥有大学学历的白人选民则支持民主党候选人(47% 对 37%)。

White voters still lean Republican (44% vs. 36%), driven by white voters without a college degree (49% vs. 27%). White college graduates favor the Democratic candidate (47% vs. 37%).

西班牙裔美国人对特朗普的态度急剧转冷,其中西班牙裔新教徒的下降最为陡峭。

Hispanic Americans have soured sharply on Trump, with the steepest declines among Hispanic Protestants.

后悔投票给特朗普的西班牙裔选民比例是白人特朗普选民的两倍(22% 对 11%)。

Hispanic Trump voters are twice as likely as white Trump voters to regret their vote (22% vs. 11%).

西班牙裔新教徒对特朗普的好感度下降了20个百分点,该群体多数在2024年支持过特朗普。目前仅有31%的人对特朗普持好感,低于2024年的51%。仅有四分之一(25%)对“让美国再次伟大”(MAGA)运动持好感,低于2024年的45%。

Trump favorability among Hispanic Protestants, a majority of whom backed Trump in 2024, has dropped 20 percentage points. Just 31% now view Trump favorably, down from 51% in 2024. Only one in four (25%) view the MAGA movement favorably, down from 45% in 2024.

四分之三(76%)的西班牙裔天主教徒——他们此前已多对特朗普持批评态度——不认可特朗普的整体工作表现。

Three quarters (76%) of Hispanic Catholics, already largely critical of Trump, disapprove of Trump’s overall job performance.

特朗普在总体美国民众中失去支持,尤其是在经济议题上,而移民议题仍是共和党基本盘的强项。

Trump is losing ground with Americans overall, especially on the economy, while immigration remains a source of strength among the Republican base.

十分之六的美国人(61%)不认可特朗普的工作表现,高于2025年的56%;强烈不认可者与强烈认可者之比超过3比1(48% 对 14%)。近半数或更多美国人强烈不认可他在每一项受测议题上的表现,包括伊朗战争(52%)、经济(48%)以及改善普通美国人生活(48%)。

Six in ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s job performance, up from 56% in 2025; strong disapproval outpaces strong approval by more than 3 to 1 (48% vs. 14%). Nearly half or more strongly disapprove of his handling of every issue tested, including the war in Iran (52%), the economy (48%), and making life better for everyday Americans (48%).

绝大多数美国人(68%)表示,过去两年里他们对特朗普的看法主要是变得更差了,其中包括几个2024年支持他的群体:西班牙裔新教徒(70%)、白人女性(65%)、65岁及以上美国人(65%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(64%)、50至64岁美国人(64%)、白人天主教徒(61%)、白人男性(61%)、没有大学学历的白人美国人(57%)。

Most Americans (68%) say their opinion of Trump has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years, including among several groups that supported him in 2024: Hispanic Protestants (70%), white women (65%), Americans ages 65 and older (65%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (64%), Americans ages 50–64 (64%), white Catholics (61%), white men (61%), white Americans without a college degree (57%).

移民问题仍是特朗普支持者的强力凝聚点。超过八成共和党人(81%)和67%的白人福音派新教徒赞同特朗普对移民问题的处理,约有一半人将移民列为他们最关键的议题之一(分别为52%和51%)。

Immigration remains a powerful anchor among Trump supporters. More than eight in ten Republicans (81%) and 67% of white evangelical Protestants approve of Trump’s handling of immigration, and about half rate immigration as among their top critical issues (52% and 51%, respectively).

美国人认为“让美国再次伟大”(MAGA)运动比“美国民主社会主义者”(DSA)构成更大威胁,而“基督教民族主义”一词在共和党人和白人福音派新教徒中获得了更坚定的拥护。

Americans see the MAGA movement as more threatening than Democratic Socialists of America, while the term “Christian nationalism” has become more firmly embraced among Republicans and white evangelical Protestants.

近半数美国人(48%)认为MAGA运动对国家构成严重威胁,而持同样看法、认为DSA构成严重威胁的为36%。八成民主党人(82%)视MAGA为严重威胁,而七成共和党人(72%)对DSA持相同看法。

Nearly half of Americans (48%) say the MAGA movement poses a serious threat to the country, compared with 36% who say the same of Democratic Socialists of America. Eight in ten Democrats (82%) see MAGA as a serious threat, while seven in ten Republicans (72%) say the same of DSA.

在听说过该词汇的美国人中,三分之二的共和党人(65%)和白人福音派新教徒(64%)现在对基督教民族主义持赞同态度。

Among Americans who have heard of the term, two-thirds of Republicans (65%) and white evangelical Protestants (64%) now hold favorable views of Christian nationalism.

选举信心依然脆弱,美国人在选举诚信和联邦干预问题上按党派界线分裂。

Confidence in elections remains fragile as Americans divide along partisan lines over election integrity and federal intervention.

只有约半数美国人(52%)对选举有信心。大多数共和党人(82%)认为美国选举最大的问题是不合格者投票,而大多数民主党人(80%)认为是合格选民被剥夺投票权。

Only about half of Americans (52%) have confidence in elections. Most Republicans (82%) say the biggest problem in U.S. elections is ineligible people casting votes, while most Democrats (80%) say it is eligible voters being denied the right to vote.

超过三分之一的美国人(35%)同意“如果对某个本地投票地点的选民欺诈存在严重担忧,总统应下令联邦特工扣押选票并接管计票工作”,相比之下,六成共和党人(58%)同意这一观点,尤其是对特朗普持好感者(65%),以及一半白人福音派新教徒(50%)。共和党人和白人福音派与其他美国人之间出现了巨大的“共情鸿沟”。

More than one-third of Americans (35%) agree that “if there are serious concerns about voter fraud in a local voting location, the president should order federal agents to seize the ballots and take over the vote counting,” compared with six in ten Republicans (58%), particularly those who view Trump favorably (65%), and half of white evangelical Protestants (50%) A large “empathy gap” has opened up between Republicans and white evangelicals vs. other Americans.

三分之二的美国人(68%)认为共情是有助于建设健康社会的基础道德价值观,而27%的人认为共情可能变得危险,因为它会让人偏离由上帝真理指引的社会建设。绝大多数民主党人(84%)和无党派人士(70%)同意共情有助于建设健康社会,相比之下,共和党人中持此观点者为54%。

Two-thirds of Americans (68%) say empathy is a foundational moral value that helps build a healthy society, compared with 27% who say it can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God’s truth. The vast majority of Democrats (84%) and independents (70%) agree that empathy helps build a healthy society, compared with 54% of Republicans.

对特朗普持好感的共和党人在共情问题上意见分歧。约有一半人支持“共情是基础道德价值观”这一表述(49%),近乎同样比例的人认为共情可能具有危险性(48%)。相比之下,近四分之三对特朗普持负面看法的共和党人(72%)视共情为基础道德价值观。

Republicans who hold a favorable view of Trump are split in their views on empathy. About half side with the statement that empathy is a foundational moral value (49%), and nearly as many believe empathy can be dangerous (48%). By contrast, nearly three-quarters of Republicans who view Trump unfavorably (72%) view empathy as a foundational moral value.

白人福音派新教徒是唯一一个多数人不同意共情为基础道德价值观的宗教群体(42%)。相反,多数人(54%)认为共情可能具有危险性。认为共情危险的观点与持有基督教民族主义观点呈正相关。

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group in which a majority does not agree that empathy is foundational moral value (42%). Instead, a majority (54%) say empathy can be dangerous. Views that empathy is dangerous are positively correlated with holding Christian nationalist views.

六成美国人支持为无证移民提供入籍途径,但共和党人和白人福音派新教徒在过去十年间急剧转向支持驱逐出境,如今多数人支持设立拘留营。

Six in ten Americans support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, but Republicans and white evangelical Protestants have moved sharply toward deportation over the past decade, and a majority now back internment camps.

十位美国人中有六位(59%)表示,只要满足一定条件,应给予无证移民一条入籍途径,这一观点自2013年以来保持稳定。然而,共和党人(从53%降至37%)和白人福音派新教徒(从56%降至44%)的支持率均有所下降,而这两个群体支持驱逐无证移民的比例则分别上升(从32%升至50%和从30%升至47%)。

Six in ten Americans (59%) say undocumented immigrants should be given a way to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements, a view that has held steady since 2013. However, support has declined among Republicans (53% to 37%) and white evangelical Protestants (56% to 44%), while support for deportations has risen among both groups (32% to 50% and 30% to 47%, respectively).

与此同时,共和党人和白人福音派新教徒中分别有62%和53%多数支持将无证移民关押在拘留营。

At the same time, majorities of Republicans and white evangelical Protestants support detaining undocumented immigrants in internment camps (62% and 53%).

尽管几乎所有美国人都反对废除第19条修正案,但关于性别角色的党派分歧已扩大一倍多,且年轻美国人中出现了巨大的性别鸿沟。

While nearly all Americans oppose repealing the 19th Amendment, the partisan divide over gender roles has more than doubled, and a large gender gap has opened among young Americans.

共和党人(65%)同意“社会变得过于软弱和女性化”的可能性,几乎是民主党人(17%)的四倍。这一党派差距已从2011年的23个百分点扩大至如今的48个百分点。

Republicans (65%) are nearly four times as likely as Democrats (17%) to agree that society has become too soft and feminine. The partisan gap has grown from 23 points in 2011 to 48 points today.

18至29岁的年轻男性比年轻女性更倾向于同意“当男女坚守其天生适合的工作和任务时,社会会更好”(43%对25%),这一18个百分点的差距约为任何年长年龄组的两倍。

Young men ages 18–29 are far more likely than young women to agree that society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for (43% vs. 25%), an 18-point gap roughly double that of any older age group.

绝大多数美国人(87%)反对废除保障妇女投票权的第19条修正案,各党派和宗教群体均表现出压倒性的反对态度。

The vast majority of Americans (87%) oppose repealing the 19th Amendment guaranteeing women’s right to vote, with overwhelming opposition across every partisan and religious group.

美国人在巴以冲突中的同情倾向现在几乎持平,且多数人更希望美国被视为可靠的邻邦,而非强权国家。

Americans’ sympathies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are now nearly at parity, and most prefer the U.S. be known as a reliable neighbor rather than a mighty nation.

美国人现在表示同情巴勒斯坦人(19%,高于2024年的15%)的可能性,与同情以色列(22%,低于2024年的28%)的可能性大致相当,18至29岁的年轻美国人(27%)比50岁及以上的美国人更倾向于同情巴勒斯坦人。

Americans are now about as likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians (19%, up from 15% in 2024) as with Israel (22%, down from 28% in 2024), with younger Americans 18-29 (27%) more likely than Americans ages 50 and older to sympathize with the Palestinians.

绝大多数美国人(64%)希望美国被视为一位可靠的邻国,仅在万不得已时才动用武力。共和党人是例外:57%的人更倾向于一个强大的国家,不犹豫使用武力;白人福音派新教徒的意见几乎持平(49%对48%)。

Most Americans (64%) prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that uses military force only as a last resort. Republicans are the exception: 57% prefer a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use force, and white evangelical Protestants are evenly divided (49% vs. 48%).

大多数美国人信任自己的邻居和不同背景的人,但年轻美国人是最不信任的群体。

Most Americans trust their neighbors and people of different backgrounds, but young Americans are the least trusting.

多数美国人表示,他们信任所在社区的人(77%)、其他宗教的人(74%)、在美国境外出生的人(72%)以及支持另一个政党的人(61%)。美国人对初次见面的人的信任度持平(48%信任,46%不信任)。18至29岁的年轻美国人是信任度最低的年龄群体。

Majorities of Americans say they trust people in their neighborhood (77%), people of another religion (74%), people born outside the United States (72%), and people who support another political party (61%). Americans are split on trusting people they meet for the first time (48% trust vs. 46% do not). Young Americans ages 18–29 are the least trusting age group.

引言 随着2026年中期选举的临近,由公共宗教研究所(PRRI)与布鲁金斯学会合作开展的第17届年度美国价值观调查,对超过5000名美国人进行了调查,深入探讨美国人对唐纳德·特朗普总统及其政府的态度,以及塑造选民偏好和中期选举投票热情的议题。该调查还揭示了美国人对国家走向、经济状况以及联邦政府满足普通美国人需求能力的担忧。

Introduction With the 2026 midterm elections approaching, the 17th annual American Values Survey of more than 5,000 Americans, conducted by PRRI in partnership with the Brookings Institution, takes a closer look at Americans’ attitudes toward President Donald Trump and his administration, as well as the issues shaping voters’ preferences and enthusiasm heading into the midterms. The survey also illuminates Americans’ concerns about the direction of the country, the state of the economy, and the federal government’s ability to meet the needs of everyday Americans.

此外,该调查还凸显了美国人对民主和选举健康状况、移民、经济不平等与社会主义、MAGA运动和基督教民族主义、同理心与性别角色、外交政策以及对不同背景人群信任的看法。国家状况 正确方向还是错误方向?

Additionally, the survey highlights Americans’ views on the health of democracy and elections, immigration, economic inequality and socialism, the MAGA movement and Christian nationalism, empathy and gender roles, foreign policy, and trust in people from different backgrounds. The State of the Country The Right or Wrong Direction?

国家 大多数美国人认为,国家正朝着错误的方向发展(71%),而27%的人认为国家正朝着正确的方向发展。美国人对国家方向的看法比2025年更加悲观,当时有62%的美国人表示国家正朝着错误的方向发展。今年,大多数民主党人认为国家正朝着错误的方向发展(93%),而共和党人中这一比例为43%。然而,共和党人认为国家正朝着错误方向发展的可能性显著增加,从2025年的24%上升;无党派人士也是如此,从2025年的71%上升至今天的77%。

The Country Most Americans say things in the country are going in the wrong direction (71%), compared with 27% who say the country is going in the right direction. Views about the direction of the country are more pessimistic than in 2025, when 62% of Americans said the country is headed in the wrong direction. This year, most Democrats say the country is going in the wrong direction (93%), compared with 43% of Republicans. However, Republicans have grown significantly more likely to say that the country is going in the wrong direction, up from 24% in 2025, as have independents, from 71% in 2025 to 77% today.

经济 大约四分之三的美国人认为经济正朝着错误的方向发展(76%),而22%的人认为经济正朝着正确的方向发展。这一看法比去年更加悲观(去年为65%认为错误,33%认为正确)。压倒性多数的民主党人(93%)和无党派人士(81%,较2025年的74%上升)表示经济正朝着错误的方向发展。共和党人对经济的不满在过去一年中上升了23个百分点,从29%上升至今天的多数(52%)。

Economy About three in four Americans say the economy is going in the wrong direction (76%), while 22% say that the economy is going in the right direction. This outlook is more pessimistic than last year (65% wrong, 33% right). Overwhelming numbers of Democrats (93%) and independents (81%, up from 74% in 2025) say the economy is going in the wrong direction. Republican dissatisfaction with the economy has gone up 23 percentage points over the last year, from 29% to a majority (52%) today.

外交事务 十位美国人中有七位认为,美国处理与其他国家关系的方式正朝着错误的方向发展(70%,较2025年的60%上升),而27%的人认为正朝着正确的方向发展。虽然共和党人(60%)比无党派人士(21%)和民主党人(6%)更有可能支持美国的外交政策,但自去年以来,各党派的支持率都有所下降,共和党人从77%下降,无党派人士从30%下降,民主党人从10%下降。

Foreign Affairs Seven in ten Americans say the way the U.S. is dealing with other countries is going in the wrong direction (70%, up from 60% in 2025), while 27% say it is going in the right direction. While Republicans (60%) are much more likely to support U.S. foreign policy than independents (21%) and Democrats (6%), support has declined across all partisans since last year, down from 77% among Republicans, 30% among independents, and 10% among Democrats.

联邦政府对无证移民的处理方式大多数美国人表示,联邦政府对无证移民的处理方式正走向错误方向(62%,高于2025年的57%),而超过三分之一的人认为其走向正确方向(36%,低于2025年的41%)。超过三分之二的民主党人(92%)和无党派人士(68%)认为联邦政府对无证移民的处理方式正走向错误方向,而只有21%的共和党人持相同看法。

Federal Government’s Handling of Undocumented Immigrants Most Americans say the way the federal government is handling undocumented immigrants is going in the wrong direction (62%, up from 57% in 2025), compared with over one-third who say it is going in the right direction (36%, down from 41% in 2025). More than two-thirds of Democrats (92%) and independents (68%) say the way the federal government is handling undocumented immigrants is going in the wrong direction, compared with 21% of Republicans.

大多数共和党人认为其走向正确方向(78%)。本地社区的情况美国人对本地社区的走向更为乐观,51%的人认为本地事务正走向正确方向,46%的人认为正走向错误方向。民主党人(48%认为正确,51%认为错误)和无党派人士(50%认为正确,47%认为错误)的看法相近,而共和党人则显著更倾向于认为本地社区正走向正确方向(65%),而认为错误的比例为34%。

Most Republicans say it is going in the right direction (78%). Things in My Local Community Americans are more upbeat about the direction of their local communities, with 51% saying things are going in the right direction and 46% saying they are going in the wrong direction. Democrats (48% right, 51% wrong) and independents (50% right, 47% wrong) are similarly divided, while Republicans are significantly more likely to say the things in their local community are going in the right direction (65%) than in the wrong direction (34%).

过去两年的变化是好是坏近四分之三的美国人认为,联邦政府满足普通美国人需求的能力在过去两年中大多变得更糟(73%),而23%的人认为大多变得更好。这一观点自2025年以来变得更为悲观(2025年为66%认为更糟,30%认为更好)。大多数民主党人(93%)和无党派人士(78%)认为情况大多变得更糟,而共和党人则更为分裂(47%认为更糟,49%认为更好)。自2025年以来,共和党人认为情况变得更糟的比例上升了13个百分点,达到34%。

Changes for the Worse or the Better, Over the Last Two Years Nearly three-quarters of Americans say that the ability of the federal government to meet the needs of everyday Americans has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (73%), while 23% say it has mostly changed for the better. This view has become more pessimistic since 2025 (66% worse, 30% in better). Most Democrats (93%) and independents (78%) say it has mostly changed for the worse, compared with Republicans, who are more divided (47% worse, 49% better). Republicans have become 13 percentage points more likely to say it changed for the worse since 2025, up from 34%.

大多数美国人表示,过去两年美国在世界上的地位和声誉总体上变差了(71%),而四分之一的人表示总体上变好了(25%)。这一看法自2025年以来变得更加悲观(63%认为变差,34%认为变好)。大多数民主党人(93%)和无党派人士(78%,高于2025年的74%)表示总体上变差了,相比之下共和党人中这一比例为43%。自去年以来,认为美国在世界上的地位和声誉总体上变差了的共和党人比例上升了16个百分点,从27%升至当前水平。

Most Americans say that America’s standing and reputation in the world has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (71%), while one-quarter say it has mostly changed for the better (25%). This view has become more pessimistic since 2025 (63% worse, 34% in better). Most Democrats (93%) and independents (78%, up from 74% in 2025) say it has mostly changed for the worse, compared with 43% of Republicans. Republicans have become 16 percentage points more likely to say that America’s standing and reputation in the world has mostly changed for the worse since last year, up from 27%.

略过半数的美国人表示,过去两年自己的经济状况总体上变差了(56%),而39%的人表示总体上变好了。这一看法自2025年以来变得更加悲观(52%认为变差,43%认为变好)。多数民主党人(72%)和无党派人士(58%)表示自己的经济状况总体上变差了,相比之下共和党人中这一比例为35%。自2025年以来,持这种悲观看法的比例在民主党人中从66%上升,在共和党人中从31%上升。

A slim majority of Americans say their own economic situation has mostly changed for the worse over the last two years (56%), while 39% say it has mostly changed for the better. This view has become more pessimistic since 2025 (52% worse, 43% in better). A majority of Democrats (72%) and independents (58%) say their economic situation mostly changed for the worse, compared with 35% of Republicans. This pessimistic view has gone up from 66% among Democrats and 31% among Republicans since 2025.

大多数美国人表示,过去两年他们对特朗普的看法总体上变差了(68%),而仅有27%的人表示总体上变好了。大多数民主党人(94%)和无党派人士(74%)表示总体上变差了。值得注意的是,超过三分之一的共和党人(35%)表示他们对特朗普的看法总体上变差了。然而,超过六成的共和党人(61%)表示总体上变好了。

Most Americans say that their opinion of Trump has mostly changed for the worse (68%) over the last two years, while just 27% say it has mostly changed for the better. Most Democrats (94%) and independents (74%) say it has mostly changed for the worse. Notably, more than one-third of Republicans (35%) say their view of Trump has mostly changed for the worse. Over six in ten Republicans (61%), however, say it has mostly changed for the better.

在宗教版图中,即使是历史上支持特朗普的群体,现在也有相当比例的人表示,过去两年他们对特朗普的看法变差了:白人福音派新教徒(44% 变差,50% 变好),耶稣基督后期圣徒教会成员(50% 变差,48% 变好),白人天主教徒(61% 变差),以及白人非福音派新教徒(64% 变差)。在支持特朗普的群体中,最引人注目的是西班牙裔新教徒,其中 70% 表示他们对特朗普的看法变差了。

[1] 对政治团体及其对国家影响的看法 美国人被要求评估,各政党和运动的政策是推动国家走向正确方向、方向错误但不危险,还是对国家构成严重威胁。

In the religious landscape, even groups that have historically supported Trump now report significant numbers saying their opinion of him has changed for the worse over the last two years: white evangelical Protestants (44% worse, 50% better), Latter-day Saints (50% worse, 48% better), white Catholics (61% worse), and white non-evangelical Protestants (64% worse). Most notable among Trump supporting groups are Hispanic Protestants, among whom 70% say their opinion of Trump has changed for the worse.[1] Perceptions of Political Groups and Their Influence on the Country Americans were asked to evaluate whether the policies of each party and movement move the country in the right direction, are misguided but not dangerous, or pose a serious threat to the country.

共和党和民主党 美国人更可能将共和党(36%)而非民主党(28%)视为对国家的严重威胁。自特朗普 2024 年连任以来,将共和党视为威胁的比例保持稳定,而将民主党视为威胁的比例则有所下降,从 32% 降至 28%。

The Republican Party and the Democratic Party Americans remain more likely to view the Republican Party (36%), rather than the Democratic Party (28%), as a serious threat to the country. While views of the Republican Party as a threat have held steady since Trump’s re-election in 2024, views of the Democratic Party as a threat have declined, from 32% to 28%.

不出所料,绝大多数党派人士认为另一个政党对国家构成严重威胁。无党派人士更可能认为共和党构成严重威胁(36%),而非民主党(25%),这与他们 2024 年的看法一致(35% 对比 27%)。

Majorities of partisans unsurprisingly see the other party as a serious threat to the country. Independents are significantly more likely to say the Republican Party poses a serious threat (36%) than the Democratic Party (25%), consistent with their views in 2024 (35% vs. 27%).

MAGA 运动和美国民主社会主义者 美国人更可能认为 MAGA 运动构成严重威胁(48%),而非美国民主社会主义者(36%)。这些看法因党派而异。大多数民主党人认为 MAGA 运动构成严重威胁(82%),而大多数共和党人对美国民主社会主义者持同样看法(72%)。无党派人士意见分歧较大,51% 认为 MAGA 运动构成严重威胁,而认为美国民主社会主义者构成严重威胁的比例为 35%。

The MAGA Movement and Democratic Socialists of America Americans are more likely to view the MAGA movement as posing a serious threat (48%) than the Democratic Socialists of America (36%). These views vary sharply by party. Most Democrats view the MAGA movement as a serious threat (82%), while most Republicans say the same about DSA (72%).

关键调查结果:

在18至29岁以及30至49岁的美国人中,各有50%的人认为“MAGA”运动的政策对国家构成了严重威胁;而在65岁及以上的美国人中,这一比例为48%。

Independents are more divided, with 51% viewing the MAGA movement as a serious threat, compared with 35% who say the same about DSA.

随着年龄的增长,认为民主党社会行动委员会(DSA)的政策对国家构成严重威胁的比例也在上升:18至29岁的美国人中这一比例为27%,30至49岁的为30%,50至64岁的为41%,65岁及以上的为45%。

在11个政治议题中,美国人最认为亟需解决的问题包括:

Half of Americans ages 18-29 and 30-49 (50% each) and 48% of Americans 65 and older say the MAGA movement’s policies pose a serious threat to the country, compared with 42% of Americans ages 50-64.

  1. 房屋价格和日常开支的持续上涨(61%);

  2. 选拔具有高尚道德品质的领导人(59%);

Views that the DSA’s policies pose a serious threat to the country increase by age: 27% of Americans ages 18-29, 30% of those ages 30-49, 41% of those ages 50-64, and 45% of those ages 65 and over.

  1. 医疗保健问题(53%)。另有约四成美国人认为以下问题同样重要:

Critical Issues Among 11 political issues, Americans are the most likely to rate increasing costs of housing and everyday expenses (61%), electing leaders of good moral character (59%), and healthcare (53%) as critical.

伊朗战争(45%)、

移民问题(40%)、

就业与失业问题(40%)、

Roughly four in ten Americans say the war in Iran (45%), immigration (40%), jobs and unemployment (40%), opposing Trump’s agenda (39%), and crime (38%) are critical issues.

反对特朗普的政策(39%)、

犯罪问题(38%)。

三分之一的人认为人工智能(AI)是一个关键问题(34%,高于2023年的19%);

One-third say artificial intelligence, or AI, is a critical issue (34%, up from 19% in 2023), while 30% say reforming the U.S. Supreme Court and 23% say supporting Trump’s agenda are critical issues.

30%的人认为改革美国最高法院至关重要,23%的人认为支持特朗普的政策是关键问题。

按党派划分:

共和党人(51%和53%)、无党派人士(62%和60%)以及民主党人(69%和68%)均认为房屋价格和日常开支的上涨以及选拔具有高尚道德品质的领导人是关键问题。

By Party Affiliation Majorities of Republicans (51% and 53%), independents (62% and 60%), and Democrats (69% and 68%) consider the increasing cost of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character to be critical issues.

对特朗普持积极看法的共和党人比持消极看法的共和党人更不认为“选拔具有高尚道德品质的领导人”是一个关键问题(51% vs 62%)。

Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are less likely than those who hold unfavorable views to say that electing leaders of good moral character is a critical issue (51% vs 62%).

大多数民主党人也认为医疗保健(67%)和伊朗战争(58%)是关键问题,而共和党人的这一比例较低(分别为39%和39%)。

Majorities of Democrats also rate healthcare (67%) and the war in Iran (58%) as critical issues, compared with smaller shares of Republicans (39% and 39%, respectively).

相反,大多数共和党人认为移民问题(52%)是关键问题,而民主党人的这一比例仅为37%。

By contrast, a majority of Republicans rate immigration (52%) as a critical issue, compared with 37% of Democrats.

两个党派的大多数成员都不认为就业与失业、犯罪问题或改革美国最高法院是关键问题。

Majorities of neither party rank jobs and unemployment, crime, artificial intelligence, or reforming the U.S. Supreme Court as critical issues.

对特朗普议程本身的看法存在严重两极分化。多数民主党人(68%)认为反对特朗普议程是一个关键问题,而独立人士中这一比例为38%,共和党人中仅为13%。支持特朗普议程在各党派中缺乏广泛共识:仅32%的共和党人将其列为关键问题,而独立人士中这一比例为17%,民主党人中为22%。

Views of Trump’s agenda itself are sharply polarized. A majority of Democrats (68%) consider opposing Trump’s agenda a critical issue, compared with 38% of independents and just 13% of Republicans. Supporting Trump’s agenda draws far less consensus across the board: Just 32% of Republicans rank it as a critical issue, compared with few independents (17%) and Democrats (22%).

移民作为主导政治讨论的关键问题的重要性,在过去两年中在民主党人、共和党人和独立人士中发生了显著变化。共和党人越来越少表示移民是一个关键问题(2024年为71%,今年为52%),而民主党人越来越多地表示如此(2024年为24%,今年为37%)。

The salience of immigration as a key issue dominating political discussions has shifted significantly over the last two years among Democrats, Republicans, and independents. While Republicans have become less likely to say immigration is a critical issue (71% in 2024 to 52% this year), Democrats have become more likely to do so (24% in 2024 to 37% this year).

按宗教划分,各宗教群体的多数人认为住房和日常开支成本上升以及选举具有良好道德品格的领导人是关键问题,但在其他方面,他们的优先事项存在分歧。非基督教宗教信徒(62%)、无宗教信仰者(58%)和有色人种基督徒(56%)的多数人将医疗保健评为关键问题,而白人基督徒中这一比例较低(46%)。有色人种基督徒的多数人还将伊朗战争(53%)和就业与失业(51%)列为关键问题。

By Religion Majorities across religious groups say rising costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are critical issues, but elsewhere their priorities diverge. While majorities of non-Christian religious adherents (62%), religiously unaffiliated (58%), and Christians of color (56%) rate healthcare as a critical issue, fewer white Christians do (46%). Majorities of Christians of color also cite the war in Iran (53%) and jobs and unemployment (51%) as critical issues.

非基督教宗教信徒中有一半(50%)将就业与失业评为关键问题,而无宗教信仰的美国人中有一半(50%)将反对特朗普议程评为关键问题。相比之下,住房和日常开支成本上升以及选举具有良好道德品格的领导人,是白人基督徒中多数人评为关键问题的唯二议题。

While half of non-Christian religious adherents (50%) rate jobs and unemployment as a critical issue, half of religiously unaffiliated Americans rate opposing Trump’s agenda as critical (50%). By contrast, increasing costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are the only issues that majorities of white Christians rate as critical.

按种族划分 多数各族裔群体表示,住房和日常开支成本上升以及选举品行良好的领导人是关键问题,至少一半人也同样看重医疗保健,但在其他问题上的优先事项存在分歧。黑人美国人最常将就业和失业(58%)、伊朗战争(53%)以及反对特朗普议程(53%)列为关键问题。西班牙裔美国人将伊朗战争(50%)和就业与失业(49%)列为关键问题。

By Race While majorities across racial groups say rising costs of housing and everyday expenses and electing leaders of good moral character are critical issues, and at least half say the same about healthcare, priorities on other issues diverge. Black Americans most often cite jobs and unemployment (58%), the war in Iran (53%), and opposing Trump’s agenda (53%) as critical issues. Hispanic Americans highlight the war in Iran (50%) and jobs and unemployment (49%) as critical issues.

亚裔和太平洋岛民美国人也将就业和失业(50%)列为优先事项,而49%的白人美国人将医疗保健列为优先事项。相比之下,混血和白人美国人中,多数人不太可能将任何其他政治问题列为优先事项。

AAPI Americans also prioritize jobs and unemployment (50%), while 49% of white Americans list healthcare. By contrast, majorities of multiracial and white Americans are less likely to prioritize any other political issue.

美国经济状况 对经济的担忧 对生活开支的担忧 近四成美国人(39%)同意“我非常担心我的家庭未来一年将无法支付住房和基本生活开支”这一说法,而57%的人不同意。民主党人(47%)和无党派人士(41%)比共和党人(27%)更可能对家庭未来一年的开支表示非常担忧。自去年以来,经济担忧在民主党人中有所上升(从42%上升),无党派人士中也有所上升(从38%上升),共和党人中略有下降(从30%下降)。

The State of the Economy in America Concerns Over the Economy Concerns Over Living Expenses Nearly four in ten Americans (39%) agree with the statement “I am very concerned that my family will not be able to pay for housing and basic living expenses over the next year,” while 57% disagree. Democrats (47%) and independents (41%) are more likely than Republicans (27%) to be very concerned over their family’s expenses over the next year. Since last year, economic concerns have increased among Democrats (up from 42%) and independents (up from 38%), and declined slightly among Republicans (down from 30%).

近六成西班牙裔美国人(58%)表示非常担心家庭未来一年将无法支付住房和基本生活开支,其次是52%的黑人美国人和47%的混血美国人。亚裔和太平洋岛民美国人(36%)和白人美国人(31%)、没有大学学位的美国人(47%)以及女性(43%)比拥有大学学位的人(26%)和男性(36%)更可能对家庭开支表示担忧。这些观点自去年以来变化不大。

Nearly six in ten Hispanic Americans (58%) say they are very concerned that their family will not be able to pay for housing and basic living expenses over the next year, followed by 52% of Black Americans and 47% of multiracial Americans. AAPI (36%) and white (31%) Americans, Americans without a college degree (47%), and women (43%) are more likely than those with a college degree (26%) and men (36%) to be concerned over their family’s expenses. These views have not shifted much since last year.

经济担忧随年龄增长而降低:18至29岁的美国人中有44%,30至49岁的有42%,50至64岁的有37%,65岁及以上的有35%。

Economic concerns decrease by age: 44% of Americans ages 18-29, 42% of those ages 30-49, 37% of those ages 50-64, and 35% of those ages 65 and over.

对于工薪家庭来说,如今难以收支平衡 约七成美国人(71%)同意“如今工薪家庭几乎不可能收支平衡”,而26%不同意。民主党(85%)和无党派人士(73%)的大多数,以及52%的共和党人同意。

Impossible Today for Working Families to Make Ends Meet About seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “it’s nearly impossible today for working families to make ends meet,” while 26% disagree. Majorities of Democrats (85%) and independents (73%), and 52% of Republicans agree.

所有种族群体中,绝大多数人都同意,如今工薪家庭几乎不可能收支平衡。然而,白人美国人(66%)持这一观点的可能性低于有色人种美国人,其中包括81%的黑人美国人、78%的西班牙裔美国人、77%的多种族美国人和72%的亚裔及太平洋岛民美国人。虽然不同年龄、性别和教育程度的大多数人都持这一观点,但女性(75%)持这一观点的可能性明显高于男性(65%)。

Solid majorities across all racial groups agree that it is nearly impossible today for working families to make ends meet. However, white Americans (66%) are less likely to hold this view than Americans of color, including 81% of Black Americans, 78% of Hispanic Americans, 77% of multiracial Americans, and 72% of AAPI Americans. While majorities across age groups, gender, and education levels hold this view, women (75%) are significantly more likely than men (65%) to do so.

经济对工薪美国人不公平 近七成美国人(69%)同意“经济对工薪美国人不公平,以使富人和有权势者获益”,而28%不同意。民主党(88%)和无党派人士(74%)的大多数持这一观点,而共和党人中为44%。

The Economy is Rigged Against Working Americans Nearly seven in ten Americans (69%) agree that “the economy is rigged against working Americans to benefit the rich and powerful,” while 28% disagree. Majorities of Democrats (88%) and independents (74%) hold this view, compared with 44% of Republicans.

所有种族群体中,绝大多数人都同意经济对工薪美国人不公平,以使富人和有权势者获益。然而,白人美国人(63%)持这一观点的可能性低于有色人种美国人,其中包括82%的黑人美国人、76%的亚裔及太平洋岛民美国人、73%的西班牙裔美国人和70%的多种族美国人。女性(72%)持这一观点的可能性明显高于男性(65%),30至49岁的美国人(74%)也高于18至29岁的年轻美国人(69%)和50岁以上的年长美国人(65%)。

Solid majorities across all racial groups agree that the economy is rigged against working Americans to benefit the rich and powerful. However, white Americans (63%) are less likely to hold this view than Americans of color, including 82% of Black Americans, 76% of AAPI Americans, 73% of Hispanic Americans, and 70% of multiracial Americans. Women (72%) are significantly more likely than men (65%) to hold this view, as are Americans ages 30-49 (74%), compared with young Americans ages 18-29 (69%) and older Americans over 50 (65%).

人工智能快速扩张有利于企业却伤害美国工人 超过十分之七的美国人(72%)认为,人工智能(AI)的快速扩张将有利于大企业,但伤害美国工人;四分之一的美国人(25%)不同意这一观点。尽管各党派群体中大多数人都持这一看法,但民主党人(82%)比独立人士(73%)和共和党人(62%)更倾向于同意AI将有利于企业却伤害美国工人。

Rapid Expansion of AI Benefits Corporations but Hurts American Workers Over seven in ten Americans (72%) agree that the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, or AI, will benefit big corporations but hurt American workers, compared with one-quarter of Americans (25%) who disagree. Though majorities of each partisan group agree with this view of AI, Democrats (82%) are more likely than independents (73%) and Republicans (62%) to agree AI will benefit corporations while hurting American workers.

四分之三的女性(74%)认为,AI的快速扩张将有利于大企业但伤害美国工人,而男性中不到十分之七(68%);性别是唯一存在显著差异的人口统计群体。

Three in four women (74%) agree the rapid expansion of AI will benefit big corporations but hurt American workers, compared with less than seven in ten men (68%); gender is the only demographic with significant differences.

经济政策 支持为所有人减税 三分之二的美国人支持为所有人减税,以加速经济增长和创造就业(65%),而29%的人反对。尽管各党派中大多数人都同意,但共和党人(79%)和独立人士(64%)比民主党人(57%)更倾向于支持。

Economic Policies Support for Cutting Taxes for Everyone Two-thirds of Americans favor cutting taxes for everyone to speed up economic growth and job creation (65%), compared with 29% who oppose. While majorities of all partisans agree, Republicans (79%) and independents (64%) are more likely to do so than Democrats (57%).

支持为所有人减税的比例在所有宗教群体中都很高,从西班牙裔天主教徒、白人福音派新教徒、黑人新教徒、西班牙裔新教徒和白人天主教徒中的约七成(70%至77%),到无宗教信仰者中的仍过半数的54%,无宗教信仰者是最不倾向于同意的群体,犹太裔美国人(55%)也是如此。

Support for cutting taxes for everyone is high across all religious groups, from about seven in ten among Hispanic Catholics, white evangelical Protestants, Black Protestants, Hispanic Protestants, and white Catholics (ranging from 70-77%) to a still-majority 54% among the religiously unaffiliated, who are the least likely to agree, along with Jewish Americans (55%).

支持对富人和企业增税 三分之二的美国人支持对富人和企业增税,以便政府能帮助那些入不敷出的人(66%),而30%的人反对。民主党人(89%)和独立人士(69%)比共和党人(40%)更有可能支持这一政策。

Support for Raising Taxes on Wealthy People and Corporations Two-thirds of Americans favor raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations so government can help people who are struggling to make ends meet (66%), compared with 30% who oppose. Democrats (89%) and independents (69%) are significantly more likely than Republicans (40%) to favor this policy.

支持对富人增税的立场在黑人新教徒(81%)、西班牙裔天主教徒(80%)和无宗教信仰美国人(79%)中最为强烈,其他非基督徒中也有75%支持。至少有六成西班牙裔新教徒(67%)、白人主流派/非福音派新教徒(63%)和犹太裔美国人(60%)也支持这项政策,白人天主教徒中支持者占58%。白人福音派新教徒(47%)和后期圣徒(43%)是唯二不支持率超过半数的群体。

Support for raising taxes on the wealthy is strongest among Black Protestants (81%), Hispanic Catholics (80%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (79%), as well as 75% of other non-Christians. At least six in ten Hispanic Protestants (67%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (63%), and Jewish Americans (60%) also favor this policy, as do 58% of white Catholics. White evangelical Protestants (47%) and Latter-day Saints (43%) are the only groups without majority support.

关于最低收入保障,六成美国人支持为所有美国人提供最低收入保障(60%,较2020年的70%下降),而三分之一的人反对(34%,较2020年的29%上升)。大多数民主党人(80%)和无党派人士(61%)支持这项政策,而共和党人中支持者占40%。自PRRI于2020年首次提出这一问题以来,各党派的支持率均有下降,当时民主党支持率为88%,无党派人士为69%,共和党人为52%。

Support for a Minimum Income Six in ten Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income (60%, down from 70% in 2020), compared with one-third who oppose (34%, up from 29% in 2020). Most Democrats (80%) and independents (61%) favor this policy, compared with 40% of Republicans (40%). Support has declined across all partisans since 2020 when PRRI first asked this question, from 88% among Democrats, 69% among independents, and 52% among Republicans.

最低收入保障的支持率在西班牙裔天主教徒(78%)、西班牙裔新教徒(77%)、黑人新教徒(74%)、其他非基督徒(73%)和无宗教信仰美国人(70%)中最高。相比之下,犹太裔美国人(56%)、白人非福音派新教徒(54%)和白人天主教徒(51%)中支持率均为小幅多数。后期圣徒(41%)和白人福音派新教徒(40%)中,仅有四成人支持为所有美国人提供最低收入保障。

Support for a guaranteed minimum income is highest among Hispanic Catholics (78%), Hispanic Protestants (77%), Black Protestants (74%), other non-Christians (73%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (70%). By contrast, smaller majorities of Jewish Americans (56%), white non-evangelical Protestant (54%), and white Catholics (51%) favor this policy. Just four in ten Latter-day Saints (41%) and white evangelical Protestants (40%) favor guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income.

为所有美国人提供最低收入保障的支持率在年轻美国人中显著更高:18至29岁和30至49岁人群的支持率均为64%,而50至64岁人群为56%,65岁及以上人群为57%。

Support for guaranteeing all Americans a minimum income is significantly higher among younger Americans: 64% each among those ages 18-29 and 30-49 favor this policy, compared with 56% of those ages 50-64 and 57% of those ages 65 and older.

三分之二的美国人支持保障所有美国人都能获得负担得起的健康保险和儿童保育服务,即使这需要增税(66%),而30%的人表示反对。大多数民主党人(86%)和无党派人士(68%)支持这一政策,相比之下,共和党人的支持率为44%。

Support for Affordable Health Insurance and Childcare Two-thirds of Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans access to affordable health insurance and childcare, even if doing so requires raising taxes (66%), compared with 30% who oppose. Most Democrats (86%) and independents (68%) favor this policy, compared with 44% of Republicans.

大约四分之三的有色人种基督徒、非基督徒和犹太裔美国人支持保障所有美国人都能获得负担得起的健康保险和儿童保育服务,其中包括黑人新教徒(79%)、其他非基督徒(78%)、西班牙裔天主教徒(77%)、无宗教归属的美国人(77%)、犹太裔美国人(76%)和西班牙裔新教徒(74%)。白人主流/非福音派新教徒(62%)和白人天主教徒(57%)的支持率有所下降,而白人福音派新教徒(48%)和后期圣徒(42%)的支持意愿最低。资本主义与社会主义:社会主义是政府福利还是政府控制经济?

Roughly three in four Christians of color, non-Christians, and Jewish Americans favor guaranteeing all Americans access to affordable health insurance and childcare, including Black Protestants (79%), other non-Christians (78%), Hispanic Catholics (77%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (77%), Jewish Americans (76%), and Hispanic Protestants (74%). Support drops among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant (62%) and white Catholics (57%), while white evangelical Protestants (48%) and Latter-day Saints (42%) are the least likely to favor it. Capitalism vs. Socialism Socialism as Government Benefits or Government Control of the Economy?

美国人中微弱多数(51%)更倾向于认同这样一种表述:“社会主义最好被理解为一种政府提供诸如健康保险、退休支持和免费高等教育等福利的制度”,而非另一种表述:“社会主义最好被理解为一种政府控制经济主要部门(如公用事业、交通、通信和银行)的制度”(43%)。

A slim majority of Americans are more likely to agree with the statement (51%) “Socialism is best understood as a system in which the government provides benefits such as health insurance, retirement support, and access to free higher education” than with the statement “Socialism is best understood as a system in which the government controls major parts of the economy, such as utilities, transportation, communications, and banks” (43%).

党派对该术语的理解存在显著差异。近四分之三的民主党人(73%)将社会主义与政府提供福利联系在一起,而只有24%的人将其视为政府控制主要产业。共和党人的看法则相反:三分之二的人将社会主义定义为政府控制经济(66%),仅31%的人将其等同于社会福利制度。无党派人士的观点与总体公众相似,51%选择福利定义,43%选择政府控制定义。

Partisans hold sharply different conceptions of the term. Nearly three-quarters of Democrats (73%) associate socialism with government-provided benefits, compared with 24% who see it as government control of major industries. Republicans reverse this pattern: Two-thirds define socialism as government control of the economy (66%), while only 31% equate it with a system of social benefits. Independents mirror the public overall, with 51% choosing the benefits definition and 43% choosing the government-control definition.

大多数其他非基督徒(66%)、黑人新教徒(63%)、无宗教归属的美国人(62%)、犹太裔美国人(60%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(56%)更倾向于将社会主义视为一种提供福利的制度,而大多数白人福音派新教徒(65%)、后期圣徒(65%)和西班牙裔新教徒(56%)更倾向于将社会主义视为一种控制经济的制度。白人主流/非福音派新教徒(50% 对 48%)和白人天主教徒(49% 对 48%)对社会主义的看法则势均力敌。

The majority of other non-Christians (66%), Black Protestants (63%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (62%), Jewish Americans (60%), and Hispanic Catholics (56%) are more likely to view socialism as a system that provides benefits, while the majority of white evangelical Protestants (65%), Latter-day Saints (65%), and Hispanic Protestants (56%) are more likely to view socialism as a system that controls the economy. White mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (50% vs. 48%) and white Catholics (49% vs. 48%) are equally divided on their views of socialism.

关于采纳社会主义某些方面的支持 大约十分之四的美国人同意“资本主义不再适合普通美国人,国家应考虑采纳社会主义的一些方面”(41%),而多数人(54%)反对这一观点。三分之二的民主党人(66%)同意该说法,相比之下,独立人士为38%,共和党人仅为18%。只有非基督徒(60%)、黑人新教徒(59%)和无宗教归属的美国人(58%)对采纳社会主义某些方面表示多数同意,而西班牙裔新教徒为48%、西班牙裔天主教徒为45%、犹太裔美国人为41%。

Support for Adopting Aspects of Socialism Around four in ten Americans agree that “capitalism is no longer working for average Americans, and the country should consider adopting some aspects of socialism” (41%), compared the majority who oppose (54%) it. Two-thirds of Democrats (66%) agree with this statement, compared with 38% of independents and just 18% of Republicans Only non-Christians (60%), Black Protestants (59%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (58%) express majority agreement with adopting aspects of socialism, compared with 48% of Hispanic Protestants, 45% of Hispanic Catholics, and 41% of Jewish Americans.

白人基督教群体最不可能同意资本主义不再奏效且国家应采纳社会主义某些方面,其中白人主流/非福音派新教徒为32%、白人天主教徒为28%、后期圣徒为26%、白人福音派新教徒为18%。

White Christian groups are the least likely to agree that capitalism is no longer working and the country should adopt aspects of socialism, including 32% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, white Catholics (28%), Latter-day Saints (26%), and white evangelical Protestants (18%).

年轻美国人比年长美国人更有可能同意资本主义不再适合普通美国人、国家应考虑采纳社会主义某些方面:18-29岁年龄段为48%,30-49岁年龄段为47%,而50-64岁年龄段为35%,65岁及以上年龄段为32%。

Younger Americans are significantly more likely than older Americans to agree that capitalism is no longer working for average Americans and the country should consider adopting some aspects of socialism: 48% among those ages 18-29 and 47% of those ages 30-49 agree, compared with 35% of those ages 50-64 and 32% of those ages 65 and older.

大多数美国人表示对军队(70%)、警察(63%,略低于2025年的67%)、高校(55%)和选举(52%)抱有“很大”或“一定”程度的信心;而对美国最高法院(45%,略低于2025年的49%)、有组织宗教(44%)、新闻机构(35%)和大型企业(33%)持同样看法的人较少。对联邦政府(2026年35%,2025年41%)和美国移民与海关执法局(ICE,2026年35%,2025年42%)的信心较去年显著下降。

Confidence in Institutions While majorities of Americans report having a great deal or some confidence in the military (70%), the police (63%, slightly down from 67% in 2025), colleges and universities (55%), and elections (52%), fewer Americans say they have a great deal or some confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court (45%, slightly down from 49% in 2025), organized religion (44%), news organizations (35%), and large business corporations (33%). Confidence in the federal government (35% in 2026, 41% in 2025) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (35% in 2026, 42% in 2025) has declined significantly since last year.

共和党人中,多数对军队(89%)、警察(83%)、ICE(74%,低于2025年的79%)、美国最高法院(71%,低于2025年的77%)、有组织宗教(66%)、选举(56%)、联邦政府(55%,低于2025年的65%)和大型企业(52%,高于2025年的48%)抱有“很大”或“一定”程度的信心;民主党人则对高校(76%)、选举(65%)、军队(63%)、警察(57%)和新闻机构(54%)的信心最高。

Majorities of Republicans have a great deal or some confidence in the military (89%), the police (83%), ICE (74%, down from 79% in 2025), the U.S. Supreme Court (71%, down from 77% in 2025), organized religion (66%), elections (56%), the federal government (55%, down from 65% in 2025), and large business corporations (52%, up from 48% in 2025), while the majority of Democrats have the most confidence in colleges and universities (76%), elections (65%), the military (63%), the police (57%), and news organizations (54%).

民主党人对有组织宗教(36%)、美国最高法院(29%)、联邦政府(28%)、大型企业(24%)和ICE(11%,低于2025年的16%)抱有“很大”信心的比例远低于共和党人。相比之下,共和党人对高校(41%)和新闻机构(23%)的信心则远低于民主党人。

Democrats are far less likely to have a great deal of confidence in organized religion (36%), the U.S. Supreme Court (29%), the federal government (28%), large business corporations (24%), and ICE (11%, down from 16% in 2025). By contrast, Republicans are by far less likely to have confidence in colleges and universities (41%) and news organizations (23%).

无党派人士的整体倾向与全体美国人相似,但对大型企业(29%)、ICE(29%,低于2025年的37%)和联邦政府(30%,低于2025年的37%)抱有“很大”或“一定”程度信心的比例较低。

While independents tend to mirror all Americans, they are less likely to have a great deal or some confidence in large business corporations (29%), ICE (29%, down from 37% in 2025), and the federal government (30%, down from 37% in 2025).

虽然大多数白人福音派新教徒和白人主流/非福音派新教徒在2025年对美国移民与海关执法局(ICE)仍抱有很大或一定程度的信心,但过去一年里,这两个群体的信心都显著下降。跌幅最大的是白人主流/非福音派新教徒,从59%降至45%,其次是白人福音派新教徒,从68%降至61%。黑人新教徒(14%,低于之前的28%)和无宗教归属的美国人(18%,低于之前的23%)对ICE的信心也有所下降。

While most white evangelical Protestants and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants had a great deal or some confidence in ICE in 2025, confidence has declined significantly among both groups over the past year. The steepest decline is among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, from 59% to 45%, followed by white evangelical Protestants, from 68% to 61%. Black Protestants (14%, down from 28%) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (18%, down from 23%) are also less likely to have confidence in ICE.

值得注意的是,西班牙裔新教徒(29%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(26%)——这两个一直是ICE执法对象的群体——对ICE的信心水平较低。

Notably, both Hispanic Protestants (29%) and Hispanic Catholics (26%) — groups that have been targeted by ICE — low levels of confidence.

特朗普总统的工作表现支持率、好感度及领导力工作表现支持率 多数美国人(61%)不认可特朗普作为总统的工作表现,而认可者占三分之一(35%)。自去年以来,对特朗普的不认可情绪有所加剧,当时不认可率为56%,认可率为42%。大多数共和党人(76%)依然认可特朗普作为总统的工作表现,相比之下,仅30%的独立人士和6%的民主党人表示认可。然而,共和党人中的认可率较去年的86%下降了10个百分点。

President Trump’s Job Approval, Favorability, and Leadership Job Approval As President A majority of Americans (61%) disapprove of the job Trump is doing as president, compared with one-third who approve (35%). Disapproval of Trump has intensified since last year, when 56% disapproved and 42% approved. Most Republicans (76%) continue to approve of the job Trump is doing as president, compared with just 30% of independents and 6% of Democrats. However, approval has declined 10 points among Republicans, from 86% since last year.

值得注意的是,强烈不认可特朗普工作表现的美国人比例是强烈认可者的三倍多(48% 对 14%)。在所有指标上,特朗普的强烈不认可数字都比强烈认可数字高出一倍以上。

Notably, more than three times as many Americans strongly disapprove than strongly approve of Trump’s job performance (48% vs. 14%). On every measure, Trump’s strongly disapprove numbers are more than twice as high as his strongly approve numbers.

白人福音派新教徒(66%)和后期圣徒(61%)是仅有的两个宗教群体,其中多数人仍然认可特朗普担任总统的工作表现。值得注意的是,三分之二的西班牙裔新教徒(66%)——这一群体在2024年支持特朗普——如今不认可他的工作表现。所有其他宗教群体要么意见分歧,要么多数人不认可,包括86%的黑人新教徒、78%的无宗教归属者、76%的西班牙裔天主教徒、75%的其他非基督徒、犹太裔美国人(65%),以及一半的白人主流/非福音派新教徒(52%不认可对48%认可)和白人天主教徒(50%不认可对49%认可)。

White evangelical Protestants (66%) and Latter-day Saints (61%) are the only religious groups in which a majority still approves of the job Trump is doing as president. Notably, two-thirds of Hispanic Protestants (66%), a group that supported Trump in 2024, now disapprove of his job performance. All other religious groups are either divided or have majorities who disapprove, including 86% of Black Protestants, 78% of religiously unaffiliated, 76% of Hispanic Catholics, 75% of other non-Christians, and Jewish Americans (65%), and half of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (52% disapprove vs. 48% approve) and white Catholics (50% disapprove vs. 49% approve).

与去年相比,特朗普的认可率在所有宗教群体中均显著下降,无宗教归属者和其他非基督徒除外,而在犹太裔美国人中则从29%上升。

Compared with last year, Trump’s approval declined significantly across all religious groups, except for the unaffiliated and other non-Christians, while it went up among Jewish Americans from 29%.

在基督教民族主义追随者中,70%认可特朗普担任总统的工作表现(低于2025年的77%),其次是同情者57%(低于2025年的67%)、怀疑者32%(低于2025年的42%)和拒绝者8%。

Among Christian nationalism Adherents, 70% approve of the job Trump is doing as president (down from 77% in 2025), followed by 57% of Sympathizers (down from 67% in 2025), 32% of Skeptics (down from 42% in 2025), and 8% of Rejecters.

在具体议题上,多数美国人不认可特朗普处理伊朗战争的工作(69%),其中多数人强烈不认可(52%),而28%表示认可。超过六成共和党人认可特朗普处理伊朗战争的工作(62%),相比之下,两成独立人士(21%)认可,仅有一成民主党人(5%)认可。

On the Issues A majority of Americans disapprove of the job Trump is doing handling the war in Iran (69%), including a majority who strongly disapprove (52%), while 28% approve. Over six in ten Republicans approve of the job Trump is doing handling the war in Iran (62%), compared with two in ten independents (21%), and only one in ten Democrats (5%).

大多数美国人不认可特朗普对经济的处理(65%,其中48%强烈不认可),而31%表示认可。不认可比例较去年有所上升(去年为58%不认可对39%认可)。共和党人多数认可(68%),相比之下,24%的独立人士和仅6%的民主党人认可。与去年相比,共和党人(从81%下降)和独立人士(从31%下降)中的认可率大幅下降。

Most Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of the economy (65%, including 48% who strongly disapprove), while 31% approve. Disapproval has grown since last year (58% disapprove vs. 39% approve). Republicans largely approve (68%), compared with 24% of independents and just 6% of Democrats. Approval has dropped sharply among Republicans (from 81%) and independents (from 31%) since last year.

大多数美国人也不赞同特朗普在改善普通美国人生活方面的工作表现(63%),其中48%强烈不赞同,而33%表示赞同。共和党人赞同的比例(72%)远高于独立人士(27%)或民主党人(6%)。

A majority of Americans also disapprove of the job Trump is doing making life better for everyday Americans (63%), including 48% who strongly disapprove, while 33% approve. Republicans are far more approving (72%) than independents (27%) or Democrats (6%).

大多数美国人不赞同特朗普对移民问题的处理(59%,其中45%强烈不赞同),而38%表示赞同。不赞同率较去年有所上升(去年为54%不赞同对43%赞同)。大多数共和党人表示赞同(81%),相比之下,独立人士为33%,民主党人为7%。赞同率较去年有所下降,共和党人从86%下降,独立人士从37%下降。在白人福音派新教徒(从74%降至67%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(从62%降至52%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(从32%降至19%)中,特朗普在移民问题上的工作赞同率在过去一年里显著下降。[2]

A majority of Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of immigration (59%, including 45% who strongly disapprove), while 38% approve. Disapproval has grown since last year (54% disapprove vs. 43% approve). Most Republicans approve (81%), compared with 33% of independents and 7% of Democrats. Approval decreased since last year, from 86% among Republicans and from 37% among independents. Trump’s job approval on immigration has declined significantly over the past year among white evangelical Protestants (74% to 67%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (62% to 52%), and Hispanic Catholics (32% to 19%).[2] Favorability Ratings Donald Trump Nearly two years into the second Trump administration, 33% of Americans hold favorable views of Trump, down slightly from 34% in May, 36% in February, and 7 percentage points lower than in September 2024 (41%) ahead of the last presidential election.

好感度评价 唐纳德·特朗普第二任特朗普政府执政近两年来,33%的美国人对特朗普持有好感,略低于5月的34%、2月的36%,并比2024年9月大选前的41%低7个百分点。六成美国人对特朗普持不利看法(62%)。

Six in ten Americans view Trump unfavorably (62%).

近八成共和党人(76%,低于2026年5月的79%)继续对特朗普持好感,相比之下,仅四分之一的独立人士(28%,高于2026年5月的25%)和5%的民主党人持好感。然而,共和党人和独立人士的好感度自2024年9月以来持续呈下降趋势,当时84%的共和党人和37%的独立人士对特朗普持好感。

Nearly eight in ten Republicans (76%, down from 79% in May 2026) continue to hold favorable views of Trump, compared with just one-quarter of independents (28%, up from 25% in May 2026), and 5% of Democrats. However, favorability among Republicans and independents has continued a downward trend since September 2024, when 84% of Republicans and 37% of independents viewed Trump favorably.

在按七级党派认同量表划分的特朗普支持率中,2024年至2026年间,无党派倾向者和倾向共和党的选民下降幅度最大。[3] “坚定共和党人”中的支持率虽仍维持高位,但已下降4个百分点,从93%降至89%。支持程度较低的共和党人支持率也显著走弱,“不太坚定的共和党人”支持率下降11个百分点,从70%降至59%。

When examining Trump’s favorability ratings by a 7-point party identification scale between 2024 and 2026, the sharpest decreases occur among independents and Republican-leaning voters.[3] While favorability among “strong Republicans” remains high, it has declined 4 points, from 93% to 89%. Support among less committed Republicans has weakened significantly too, with favorability among “not very strong Republicans” dropping 11 points, from 70% to 59%.

“倾向共和党者”同样出现显著下跌,下降12个百分点,从69%降至57%。真正的无党派人士(即不倾向任何党派者)也出现显著下降,减少20个百分点,从35%降至15%。倾向民主党者和坚定民主党人对特朗普的看法在过去两年里基本未变,但“不太坚定的民主党人”也下降了7个百分点,从12%降至5%。

“Republican leaners” also show a significant decline, falling 12 points, from 69% to 57%. Significant declines were also evident among true independents (those who do not lean toward either party), who experienced a 20-percentage-point decrease, from 35% to 15%. While Democrat leaners and strong Democrats remained virtually unchanged in their view of Trump over the last two years, “not very strong Democrats” also dropped 7 points, from 12% to 5%.

在2024年大选中支持特朗普的群体里,白人福音派新教徒对特朗普的支持率最高(62%),是唯一对特朗普持多数支持态度的宗教群体。白人天主教徒和白人主流/非福音派新教徒目前意见各半(分别有49%和46%持支持态度)。然而,这三个群体自2024年以来对特朗普的支持度均有所下降:当时白人福音派新教徒支持率为72%,白人主流/非福音派新教徒为53%,白人天主教徒为51%。如今,西班牙裔新教徒中仅31%持支持态度,较2024年的51%大幅下滑。

Among groups who supported Trump in the 2024 election, Trump’s favorability remains highest among white evangelical Protestants (62%), the only religious group where the majority holds a favorable view of him. White Catholics and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants are now divided (49% and 46% hold favorable views, respectively). However, all three groups have become less favorable toward Trump since 2024, when 72% of white evangelical Protestants, 53% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, and 51% of white Catholics held favorable views. Only 31% of Hispanic Protestants now hold a favorable view of Trump, down from 51% in 2024.

基督教民族主义“追随者”(67%)和“同情者”(54%)中,多数人对特朗普持支持态度,而“怀疑者”和“拒绝者”分别仅为30%和6%。自2024年以来,所有群体对特朗普的支持率均显著下降(分别从78%、66%、41%和11%下降)。特朗普的领导力:特朗普是强有力的领袖,还是危险的独裁者?

Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (54%) have a favorable opinion of Trump, compared with 30% of Skeptics and 6% of Rejecters. Favorable views of Trump have gone down significantly since 2024 across all groups (78%, 66%, 41%, and 11%, respectively). Trump’s Leadership Trump is a Strong Leader or a Dangerous Dictator?

大多数美国人更倾向于认同以下观点:“特朗普总统是一个潜在的危险独裁者,应在其破坏美国民主之前限制其权力”(58%),而非“特朗普总统是一位强有力的领导者,应该被赋予所需的权力以重振美国的辉煌”(37%)。

A majority of Americans are more likely to agree with the statement “President Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited before he destroys American democracy” (58%) than with the statement “President Trump is a strong leader who should be given the power he needs to restore America’s greatness” (37%).

认为特朗普是潜在危险独裁者的美国人比例从2025年3月的52%上升至2025年9月的56%,如今达到了58%。大多数民主党人(90%,高于3月份的87%)支持第一种观点,而大多数共和党人则支持第二种观点(77%,略低于3月份的81%)。独立选民中认为特朗普是危险独裁者的比例也从3月份的56%上升到了64%。

The percentage of Americans who see Trump as a potentially dangerous dictator has grown, from 52% in March 2025 to 56% in September 2025 to 58% today. Most Democrats (90%, up from 87% in March) agree with the first statement and most Republicans agree with the second statement (77%, slightly down from 81% in March). The proportion of independents who agree that Trump is a dangerous dictator has increased by 8 percentage points since March, from 56% to 64%.

目前,白人福音派新教徒是唯一一个明确多数认为特朗普是强有力的领导者的宗教群体(65%,低于3月份的73%);而白人天主教徒(52%,低于56%)以及白人主流/非福音派新教徒(48%,低于54%)在这一问题上的意见则较为分裂。相比之下,80%的黑人新教徒、75%的无宗教信仰者、72%的其他非基督教徒、71%的西班牙裔天主教徒、64%的犹太裔美国人以及62%的西班牙裔新教徒都认为特朗普是一个潜在的危险独裁者,其权力应受到限制。

Today, white evangelical Protestants are the only religious group in which a clear majority believe Trump is a strong leader (65%, down from 73%); white Catholics (52%, down from 56%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (48%, down from 54%) are more divided. By contrast, 80% of Black Protestants, 75% of unaffiliated Americans, 72% of other non-Christians, 71% of Hispanic Catholics, 64% of Jewish Americans, and 62% of Hispanic Protestants view Trump as a potentially dangerous dictator whose power should be limited.

大多数反对基督教民族主义的人(90%)和持怀疑态度的人(64%)都认为特朗普是一个潜在的危险独裁者;而只有39%的基督教民族主义支持者和26%的追随者持这种观点。相反,大多数基督教民族主义的支持者(72%)和追随者(60%)则认为特朗普是一位强有力的领导者,应该被赋予所需的权力来重振美国的辉煌;相比之下,只有36%的怀疑态度者和10%的反对者持有这种观点。

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (90%) and Skeptics (64%) agree that Trump is a potentially dangerous dictator, compared with just 39% of Sympathizers and 26% of Adherents. By contrast, most Adherents (72%) and Sympathizers (60%) view Trump as a strong leader who should be given the power to restore America’s greatness, compared with 36% of Skeptics and just 10% of Rejecters.

对“让美国再次伟大”(MAGA)运动的看法 三成美国人对“让美国再次伟大”(MAGA)运动持有正面看法(31%),而61%的人持有负面看法。仅4%的人未曾听说过这个词。对MAGA运动的正面看法已从2024年3月的35%下降,当时PRRI首次提出这个问题。共和党人(72%)持有正面看法的可能性,明显高于无党派人士(25%)和民主党人(5%)。自2024年3月以来,共和党人的看法保持稳定,而无党派人士和民主党人持有正面看法的可能性已降低,分别从29%和9%下降。

Favorable Views of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) Movement Three in ten Americans hold favorable views of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement (31%), compared with 61% who hold unfavorable views. Just 4% have not heard of this term. Favorable views of the MAGA movement have decreased from 35% in March 2024, when PRRI first asked this question. Republicans (72%) are significantly more likely than independents (25%) and Democrats (5%) to hold favorable views of the MAGA movement. Republican views have remained stable since March 2024, while independents and Democrats have become less likely to hold favorable views, down from 29% and 9%, respectively.

白人福音派新教徒是唯一多数人对MAGA运动持正面看法的宗教群体(61%),其次是白人天主教徒(46%)、后期圣徒(44%)和白人主流/非福音派新教徒(42%)。值得注意的是,仅四分之一的西班牙裔新教徒(25%)对MAGA运动持正面看法,较2024年的45%下降。犹太裔美国人中不足三成(28%),以及其他非基督教徒(26%)持正面看法,无党派美国人(16%)、西班牙裔天主教徒(15%)和黑人新教徒(11%)的比例更低。

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group among whom a majority view the MAGA movement favorably (61%), followed by white Catholics (46%), Latter-day Saints (44%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (42%). Notably, only one in four Hispanic Protestants (25%) hold a favorable view of the MAGA movement, down from 45% in 2024. Less than three in ten Jewish Americans (28%), and other non-Christians (26%) hold favorable views of the MAGA movement, as do even fewer unaffiliated Americans (16%), Hispanic Catholics (15%), and Black Protestants (11%).

基督教民族主义拥护者中,超过三分之二(67%)对MAGA运动持正面看法,其次是52%的同情者,较2024年的58%下降。相比之下,仅27%的怀疑者——较2024年的34%下降——和5%的反对者持正面看法。

More than two-thirds of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) hold favorable views of the MAGA movement, followed by 52% of Sympathizers, down from 58% in 2024. By contrast, just 27% of Skeptics — down from 34% in 2024 — and 5% of Rejecters hold favorable views.

基督教民族主义与正面看法 三分之一的美国人(33%)符合基督教民族主义拥护者或同情者的条件,这一比例自PRRI于2022年底首次提出这些问题以来一直相对稳定(范围在29%至34%之间)。近六成的共和党人符合基督教民族主义拥护者或同情者的条件(59%),而无党派人士仅26%,民主党人仅18%。

Christian Nationalism and Favorable Views One-third of Americans (33%) qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers, a share that has held relatively stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022 (ranging from 29% to 34%). Nearly six in ten Republicans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (59%), compared with only 26% of independents and 18% of Democrats.

当被问及对“基督教民族主义”这一术语本身的看法时,美国人持不利看法(48%)的可能性是持有利看法(24%)的两倍。自2022年以来,对“基督教民族主义”这一术语持有利看法的比例已从20%上升。与此同时,表示未曾听说过该术语的美国人比例已从35%下降至24%。

When asked about their perceptions of the term “Christian nationalism” itself, Americans are twice as likely to hold unfavorable (48%) as favorable (24%) views of the term. Favorable views of the term “Christian nationalism” have increased since 2022 from 20%. At the same time, the share of Americans who say they have not heard of the term has dropped from 35% to 24%.

在听说过“基督教民族主义”这一术语的美国人中,三分之一持有利看法(32%),而63%持不利看法。在听说过基督教民族主义的共和党人中,三分之二持有利看法(65%),而无党派人士为28%,民主党人为13%。这些看法自2022年以来一直保持稳定。

Among Americans who have heard of the term “Christian nationalism,” one-third hold a favorable view of the term (32%), compared with 63% who hold an unfavorable view. Two-thirds of Republicans who have heard of Christian nationalism hold a favorable view of the term (65%), compared with 28% of independents and 13% of Democrats. These views have remained stable since 2022.

在听说过基督教民族主义的宗教群体中,近三分之二的白人福音派新教徒(64%)持有利看法,其次是约四成的西班牙裔新教徒(43%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(42%)和白人天主教徒(40%)。约三成的黑人新教徒(32%)和四分之一的西班牙裔天主教徒(25%)也持有利看法,其他非基督教宗教成员(17%)、犹太裔美国人(15%)和无宗教信仰美国人(9%)亦是如此。

Among religious groups who have heard of Christian nationalism, nearly two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (64%) hold favorable views of the term, followed by around four in ten Hispanic Protestants (43%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (42%), and white Catholics (40%). Around three in ten Black Protestants (32%) and one in four Hispanic Catholics (25%) also view Christian nationalism favorably, as do one in ten members of other non-Christian religions (17%), Jewish Americans (15%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (9%).

白人基督教群体(白人福音派新教徒、白人主流/非福音派新教徒、白人天主教徒)持有利看法的可能性显著高于2022年,而有色人种基督徒(西班牙裔新教徒、西班牙裔天主教徒和黑人新教徒)持有利看法的可能性则较低。

White Christian groups (white evangelical Protestants, white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, white Catholics) are significantly more likely to hold favorable views of Christian nationalism today than they did in 2022, while Christians of color (Hispanic Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, and Black Protestants) are less likely to do so.

在听说过“基督教民族主义”这一术语的人中,基督教民族主义拥护者(84%)和同情者(64%)中,压倒性多数对该术语持有正面看法,而怀疑者中为25%,拒绝者中仅为3%。同情者是唯一一个对基督教民族主义持正面看法比例下降的群体,从2022年的72%降至今天的64%。

Among those who have heard of the term “Christian nationalism,” strong majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (84%) and Sympathizers (64%) hold favorable views of the term, compared with 25% of Skeptics and just 3% of Rejecters. Sympathizers are the only group whose favorable views of Christian nationalism have declined, from 72% in 2022 to 64% today.

选举与政党 2026年中期选举投票热情 在登记选民中 在这项调查进行时,即9月初,36%的美国成年人表示计划投票支持其选区的民主党国会候选人,28%表示计划投票支持共和党候选人,19%表示不确定,12%表示不打算投票,4%表示计划投票支持“其他”或第三党候选人。在计划投票的登记选民中,43%表示将支持民主党人,36%支持共和党人,3%支持其他候选人,18%不确定。

Elections and Political Parties The 2026 Midterm Election Vote Excitement Among Registered Voters At the time of this survey, in early September, 36% of American adults say they plan to vote for the Democratic congressional candidate in their district, 28% say they plan to vote for the Republican candidate, 19% are unsure, 12% say they did not plan to vote, and 4% say they plan to vote for an “other” or third-party candidate. Among registered voters who plan to vote, 43% say they will support the Democrat, 36% support the Republican, 3% support other candidates, and 18% are unsure.

在我们上次中期选举时,我们的2022年美国价值观调查发现,在登记选民中,投票意向更为均衡,38%的人表示计划投票支持民主党国会候选人,而37%的人表示计划投票支持共和党候选人。表示不确定自己投票意向的登记选民比例为24%。

At the time of our last midterm election, our 2022 American Values Survey found that among registered voters, voting intentions were more evenly split, with 38% saying they planned to vote for Democrats for Congress, compared with 37% who said they were planning to vote for Republicans. The percentage of registered voters indicating they were unsure of their vote stood at 24%.

四分之三的计划在即将到来的中期选举中投票的登记选民表示,对11月的投票至少有一点兴奋,其中34%的人非常兴奋,23%的人有些兴奋,17%的人有一点兴奋。四分之一的人对投票完全不感兴奋(26%)。在计划投票且对投票至少有些兴奋的登记选民中,54%支持民主党人,37%支持共和党人,2%支持其他候选人,7%不确定。

Three-quarters of registered voters who plan on voting in the upcoming midterms report being at least a little excited about voting in November, including 34% who are very excited, 23% who are somewhat excited, and 17% who are a little excited. One in four are not at all excited about voting (26%). Among the registered voters who plan to vote and are at least somewhat excited about voting, 54% support the Democrat, 37% support the Republican, 2% support other candidates, and 7% were unsure.

超过四分之三的计划投票的登记共和党选民对投票至少有点兴奋(76%),其中包括31%非常兴奋的选民。计划投票的登记民主党选民更有可能对投票感到兴奋,82%至少有点兴奋,近一半非常兴奋(46%)。无党派选民最不可能说他们对投票感到兴奋(63%),其中包括25%非常兴奋的选民。

More than three-quarters of registered Republican voters who plan to vote are at least a little excited about voting (76%), including 31% who are very excited. Registered Democratic voters who plan to vote are more likely to be excited about voting, with 82% at least a little excited, and nearly half very excited (46%). Independents are the least likely to say they are excited about voting (63%), including 25% who are very excited.

在计划投票的登记选民中,按宗教群体划分,黑人新教徒(43%)最有可能说他们对中期选举投票非常兴奋。大约四成的犹太裔美国人(39%)和无宗教信仰美国人(37%)也表示非常兴奋,西班牙裔天主教徒(35%)、其他非基督徒(33%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(32%)、白人福音派新教徒(31%)和白人天主教徒(31%)中约有三分之一也表示非常兴奋。西班牙裔新教徒(26%)最不可能对投票非常兴奋。特朗普联盟的削弱?

Among registered voters who plan on voting by religious groups, Black Protestants (43%) are the most likely to say they are very excited about voting in the midterms. Around four in ten Jewish Americans (39%) and unaffiliated Americans (37%) also report being very excited, as do about one-third of Hispanic Catholics (35%), other non-Christians (33%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (32%), white evangelical Protestants (31%), and white Catholics (31%). Hispanic Protestants (26%) are the least likely to be very excited about voting. The Weakening Trump Coalition?

在2024年总统选举中,特朗普在历史上支持民主党的群体中取得了显著进展。根据皮尤研究中心的经核实选民研究,特朗普在30岁以下男性(从2020年的39%上升至46%)和黑人选民(从8%上升至15%)中各获得了7个百分点的增长。最引人注目的是他在西班牙裔选民中的进展,支持率跳升了12个百分点,从36%上升至48%。这些变化使一些观察人士预测,共和党有望在年轻选民和非白人选民中继续取得进展。

In the 2024 presidential election, Trump made notable gains among groups that have historically backed Democrats. According to Pew Research Center’s validated voter study, Trump gained 7 percentage points among both men under 30 (from 39% in 2020 to 46%) and Black voters (from 8% to 15%). Most striking was his gain among Hispanic voters, whose support jumped 12 points, from 36% to 48%. These shifts led some observers to predict that Republicans were poised for continued gains among younger and non-white voters.

但有迹象表明,这些得票并非长期党派重组的一部分。在中期选举临近之际,黑人和西班牙裔选民似乎更倾向于支持民主党。在计划投票的登记选民中,黑人选民大幅支持民主党候选人(69%对8%),西班牙裔选民(48%对26%)和亚裔及太平洋岛民选民(59%对22%)也是如此。相比之下,白人选民倾向于支持共和党候选人(44%对36%)。没有大学学位的白人选民更可能支持共和党候选人(49%对27%),而拥有大学学位的白人选民更可能支持民主党候选人(47%对37%)。

But there are signs those gains were not part of a long-term partisan realignment. Heading into the midterms, Black and Hispanic voters appear far more inclined to back Democrats. Among registered voters who plan to vote, Black voters favor the Democratic candidate by a wide margin (69% vs. 8%), as do Hispanic voters (48% vs. 26%) and AAPI voters (59% vs. 22%). White voters, by contrast, lean toward the Republican candidate (44% vs. 36%). White voters without a college degree are more likely to favor the Republican candidate (49% vs. 27%), while white voters with a college degree are more likely to favor the Democratic candidate (47% vs. 37%).

计划投票的女性更可能表示会投给民主党候选人(45%),而非共和党候选人(32%),而男性表示会投给民主党或共和党候选人的可能性相同(41%对40%)。在各年龄段中,计划投票的18至29岁(47%对29%)和30至49岁(44%对29%)美国人更可能表示会投给民主党候选人,而非共和党候选人;50至64岁(38%对41%)和65岁及以上(44%对41%)美国人则分歧较小。

Women who plan to vote are more likely to say they would vote for the Democratic candidate (45%) over the Republican candidate (32%), while men are equally likely to say they would vote for the Democratic or the Republican candidate (41% vs. 40%). Across age groups, Americans ages 18-29 (47% vs. 29%) and 30-49 (44% vs. 29%) who plan to vote are more likely to say they would vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate, while Americans ages 50-64 (38% vs. 41%) and 65 and older (44% vs. 41%) are more evenly divided.

性别差异在年轻选民中尤为明显。18至29岁女性中,多数(53%)表示会投给民主党候选人,而投给共和党候选人的占26%;同一年龄段的男性分歧较小(42%支持民主党,32%支持共和党)。不过值得注意的是,年轻男性仍比年轻女性多10个百分点支持民主党候选人。在50至64岁和65岁及以上选民中,男性更可能支持共和党候选人(两者均为47%),而所有年龄段的女性更可能支持民主党候选人。

Gender differences are particularly pronounced among younger voters. A majority of women ages 18-29 (53%) say they would vote for the Democratic candidate, compared with 26% who would vote for the Republican candidate, while men in this age group are more closely divided (42% Democratic vs. 32% Republican). Notably, however, young men remain 10 points more likely to back Democratic candidates. Among voters ages 50-64 and those ages 65 and older, men are more likely to support the Republican candidate (both 47%), while women across all age groups are more likely to support the Democratic candidate.

一直存在一种持续的迷思,认为选举模式中存在“信仰差距”:一个人参加教堂礼拜的频率越高,就越有可能投票给共和党。然而,这种线性正相关关系仅适用于白人选民。每周或更频繁参加教堂礼拜的白人登记选民(61%对19%)或每月参加一次(51%对31%)的,更有可能投票给共和党候选人,而参加教堂礼拜很少或从不参加的白人登记选民,则更有可能投票给民主党候选人(48%对32%)。

There has been a persistent mythology that a “God gap” is apparent in voting patterns: The more frequently one attends church, the more likely one is to vote Republican. However, this linear positive relationship only holds true for white voters. White registered voters who attend weekly or more (61% vs. 19%) or attend monthly (51% vs. 31%) are more likely to vote for the Republican candidate than the Democratic candidate, while white registered voters who attend seldom or never are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate (48% vs. 32%).

相比之下,每月参加教堂礼拜(45%对25%)或很少或从不参加(56%对18%)的西班牙裔登记选民,更有可能投票给民主党候选人,而每周参加一次的选民,投票给两个候选人的可能性相同。黑人登记选民,无论参加教堂礼拜的频率如何,都更有可能投票给民主党候选人。

By contrast, Hispanic registered voters who attend church monthly (45% vs. 25%) or seldom or never (56% vs. 18%) are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate, while those who attend weekly are equally likely to vote for either candidate. Black registered voters, regardless of church attendance, are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate.

在已登记并计划投票的人中,白人福音派新教徒(68%)和白人天主教徒(51%)是唯二拥有多数人投票给共和党候选人的宗教群体。西班牙裔新教徒(44%共和党对35%民主党)和白人主流/非福音派新教选民(43%共和党对35%民主党)的多数人更有可能表示会投票给共和党候选人,而非民主党候选人。相比之下,黑人新教徒(76%)、无宗教信仰者(63%)、其他非基督徒(56%)、犹太裔美国人(52%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(48%)的绝大多数表示,他们会投票给民主党候选人,而非共和党候选人。

Among those who are registered to vote and plan to vote, white evangelical Protestants (68%) and white Catholics (51%) are the only religious groups with majorities who would vote for the Republican candidate. Pluralities of Hispanic Protestants (44% Republican vs. 35% Democrat) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestant voters (43% Republican vs. 35% Democrat) are more likely to say they would vote for the Republican candidate than the Democratic candidate. By contrast, strong majorities of Black Protestants (76%), the religiously unaffiliated (63%), other non-Christians (56%), Jewish Americans (52%), and Hispanic Catholics (48%) say they would vote for the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate.

我们询问了美国人在2024年总统大选中投给了谁,以及他们是否对自己的投票选择感到满意或后悔。在特朗普选民中,13%表示后悔自己的投票,而投给前副总统卡玛拉·哈里斯的选民中,这一比例为3%。在未投票者中,24%表示后悔自己的决定。

Regret About 2024 Presidential Vote Choice We asked Americans who they voted for in the 2024 presidential election and whether they were satisfied or regretted their vote choice. Among Trump voters, 13% say they regret their vote, compared with 3% who voted for former Vice President Kamala Harris. Among those who did not vote, 24% said they regret their decision.

在特朗普选民中,23%的独立选民表示后悔自己的投票,而共和党选民中这一比例仅为8%。相比之下,在哈里斯选民中,仅有5%的独立选民和1%的民主党选民表示后悔自己的投票。

Among Trump voters, 23% of independents say they regret their vote, compared with just 8% of Republicans. By contrast, among Harris voters, just 5% of independents and 1% of Democrats say they regret their vote.

跨种族群体来看,特朗普选民后悔投票的可能性明显高于哈里斯选民。这一差距在西班牙裔选民中更大,22%的特朗普选民后悔自己的投票,而哈里斯选民中仅为4%。在白人选民中,11%的特朗普选民后悔自己的投票,而哈里斯选民中为3%。在黑人选民中,他们大多投给了哈里斯,仅有3%后悔自己的投票。

Across racial groups, Trump voters are significantly more likely than Harris voters to regret their vote. This gap is wider among Hispanic voters, with 22% of Trump voters regretting their vote, compared with 4% of Harris voters. Among white voters, 11% of Trump voters regret their vote, compared with 3% of Harris voters. Among Black voters, who mostly voted for Harris, just 3% regret their vote.

白人基督徒选民大多投给了特朗普,如果他们投给特朗普,后悔投票的可能性也高于投给哈里斯的情况(10% 对 4%)。这在白人主流/非福音派新教徒(12% 对 4%)和白人天主教徒(7% 对 3%)中均有体现。在白人福音派新教徒中,10%的特朗普选民和6%的哈里斯选民后悔自己的投票。相比之下,在有色人种基督徒和非基督徒中,他们大多投给了哈里斯,哈里斯选民后悔投票的比例相对较小,包括无宗教归属的美国人(2%)、黑人新教徒(2%)、西班牙裔天主教徒(3%)和非基督教宗教成员(6%)。

White Christian voters, who mostly voted for Trump, are also more likely to regret their vote if they voted for Trump than if they voted for Harris (10% vs. 4%). This is evident among white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (12% vs. 4%) and white Catholics (7% vs. 3%). Among white evangelical Protestants, 10% of Trump voters and 6% of Harris voters regret their vote. By contrast, among Christians of color and non-Christians, who mostly voted for Harris, relatively smaller shares of Harris voters regret their vote, including religiously unaffiliated Americans (2%), Black Protestants (2%), Hispanic Catholics (3%), and members of non-Christian religions (6%).[4] Notably, among religiously unaffiliated Americans who voted for Trump, 23% regret their vote.

值得注意的是,在投给特朗普的无宗教归属美国人中,23%后悔自己的投票。[4]在各年龄段中,特朗普选民后悔自己投票的比例高于哈里斯选民,但年轻特朗普选民后悔的比例明显高于年长特朗普选民。18至29岁的特朗普选民中有五分之一(20%)后悔自己的投票,30至49岁年龄段为18%,而50至64岁年龄段为11%,65岁及以上年龄段仅为9%。

Across age groups, Trump voters are more likely than Harris voters to regret their vote, but younger Trump voters are considerably more likely than older Trump voters to regret their vote. One in five Trump voters ages 18-29 (20%) regrets their vote, as do 18% of those ages 30-49, compared with 11% of those ages 50-64 and 9% of those ages 65 and older.

男性和女性特朗普选民后悔投票的可能性相近(13% 对 14%),哈里斯选民也是如此(均为3%)。

Men and women who voted for Trump are similarly likely to regret their vote (13% vs. 14%) as those who voted for Harris (both 3%).

对政党的好感度 共和党 约三分之一的美国人(34%)对共和党持好感,而多数人(59%)对其持不利看法。自公共宗教研究院(PRRI)2012年首次提问以来,共和党的好感度已下降(当时为44%)。大多数共和党人(80%)对本党持好感,相比之下,独立人士为28%,民主党人仅为6%。自2012年以来,独立人士(从43%降至28%)和民主党人(从11%降至6%)对共和党的好感度均有下降,共和党人自身的好感度也从86%降至80%。

Favorability for the Parties The Republican Party Around one-third of Americans (34%) hold favorable views of the Republican Party, while a majority (59%) view it unfavorably. Favorability for the Republican Party has declined since PRRI first asked this question in 2012 (44%). Most Republicans (80%) hold favorable views of their own party, compared with 28% of independents and 6% of Democrats. Since 2012, favorable views of the Republican Party have declined among independents (43% to 28%) and Democrats (11% to 6%), while Republicans’ favorability has also dropped, from 86% to 80%.

白人福音派新教徒(64%,低于2025年的71%)和后期圣徒(59%)最有可能对共和党持好感,其次是约一半的白人天主教徒(51%),以及45%的白人主流/非福音派新教徒(低于2025年的55%)。约三分之一的西班牙裔新教徒(34%)现持好感,低于2025年的49%,随后是四分之一的犹太裔美国人(26%)、其他非基督徒(24%),以及约两成的西班牙裔天主教徒(22%)和无宗教归属美国人(19%)。黑人新教徒(11%)对共和党持好感的比例最低。

White evangelical Protestants (64%, down from 71% in 2025) and Latter-day Saints (59%) are the most likely to hold favorable views of the Republican Party, followed by about half of white Catholics (51%), and 45% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (down from 55% in 2025). Around one-third of Hispanic Protestants (34%) now hold favorable views, down from 49% in 2025, followed by one in four Jewish Americans (26%), other non-Christians (24%) as well as around two in ten Hispanic Catholics (22%) and unaffiliated Americans (19%). Black Protestants (11%) are the least likely to hold favorable views of the Republican Party.

PRRI 询问美国人选择他们对共和党持负面看法的所有原因。在持负面看法的 59% 美国人中,三分之二表示是因为该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观(66%)。约六成表示是因为该党对特朗普过于顺从(55%),48% 表示该党极端且过于右翼(低于 2025 年的 55%)。三成表示共和党与宗教团体关系过于紧密(30%),仅 6% 表示是因为该党不够保守。

Reasons Americans View the Republican Party Unfavorably PRRI asked Americans to select all the reasons they hold an unfavorable view of the Republican Party. Of the 59% who hold unfavorable views, two-thirds say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (66%). About six in ten say it is because the party is too deferential to Trump (55%) and 48% say it is extreme and too right-wing (down from 55% in 2025). Three in ten say the Republican party is too closely aligned with religious groups (30%), and just 6% say it is because the party is not conservative enough.

只有 18% 的共和党人对本党持负面看法。其中超过四成表示,要么是因为该党对特朗普过于顺从(44%),要么是因为该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观(43%)。三成表示是因为该党极端且过于右翼(31%)。不足两成表示该党与宗教团体关系过于紧密(14%)或不够保守(11%)。

Only 18% of Republicans view their own party unfavorably. Over four in ten of these Republicans say it is either because the party is too deferential to Trump (44%) or it does not represent the interests and values of people like them (43%). Three in ten say it is because the party is extreme and too right-wing (31%). Less than two in ten say the party is too closely tied to religious groups (14%) or is not conservative enough (11%).

在持负面看法的 68% 独立人士中,大多数表示是因为该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观(62%,略低于 2025 年的 65%)、对特朗普过于顺从(55%,低于 2025 年的 59%),或极端且过于右翼(47%,低于 2025 年的 56%)。三成表示该党与宗教团体关系过于紧密(27%),6% 表示该党不够保守。

Of the 68% of independents who hold an unfavorable view of the Republican Party, most say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (62%, slightly down from 65% in 2025), is too deferential to Trump (55%, down from 59% in 2025), or is extreme and too right-wing (47%, down from 56% in 2025). Three in ten say it is too closely tied to religious groups (27%), and 6% say the party is not conservative enough.

民主党 超过三分之一的美国人对民主党持有好感(36%),而约六成人持有反感(57%)。自2012年以来,对民主党的好感度有所下降,当时略过半数(51%)持好感态度。民主党人对本党的好感度也大幅下降,从2012年的93%降至如今的77%。无党派人士的好感度同样下降,从2012年的46%降至2026年的33%。共和党人对民主党的看法始终保持在低位(10%至7%)。

The Democratic Party Over one-third of Americans view the Democratic Party favorably (36%), compared with around six in ten who view it unfavorably (57%). Favorable views of the Democratic Party have declined since 2012, when a slim majority (51%) viewed it favorably. Democrats’ favorability toward their own party has also dropped sharply, from 93% in 2012 to 77% today. Favorable views among independents have declined as well, from 46% in 2012 to 33% in 2026. Republicans have held consistently low views of the Democratic Party (10% to 7%).

三分之二的黑人新教徒(66%,高于2025年的52%)和一半的西班牙裔天主教徒(49%)对民主党持好感态度,其他非基督教宗教成员(45%)、犹太裔美国人(43%)和无宗教归属的美国人(42%)中约有四成持好感态度。约三成西班牙裔新教徒(33%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(32%,高于2025年的26%)、白人天主教徒(27%)和后期圣徒(26%)也持好感态度。仅15%的白人福音派新教徒对民主党持好感态度。

Two-thirds of Black Protestants (66%, up from 52% in 2025) and half of Hispanic Catholics (49%) hold favorable views of the Democratic Party, as do about four in ten members of other non-Christian religions (45%), Jewish Americans (43%), and unaffiliated Americans (42%). Around three in ten Hispanic Protestants (33%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (32%, up from 26% in 2025), white Catholics (27%), and Latter-day Saints (26%) also hold favorable views. Only 15% of white evangelical Protestants view the Democratic Party favorably.

在六成对民主党持反感态度的美国人(57%,略低于2025年的60%)中,多数人表示原因是该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观(59%,低于2025年的65%),或因为该党极端且过于左倾(53%)。约两成人认为是因为民主党反宗教(22%)或没有足够努力对抗特朗普(19%),13%认为该党不够进步。

Of the six in ten Americans (57%, slightly down from 60% in 2025) who view the Democratic Party unfavorably, the majority say it is because the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (59%, down from 65% in 2025) or because the party is extreme and too left-wing (53%). Around two in ten say it is because the Democratic Party is anti-religious (22%) or not fighting hard enough against Trump (19%), and 13% say the party is not progressive enough.

在对本党持负面看法的民主党人(占21%)中,近六成(59%)表示原因是该党没有足够努力地对抗特朗普。超过三分之一认为该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观(36%)或不够进步(35%)。两成认为该党极端且过于左倾(19%),仅7%因该党反宗教而持负面看法。

Of the 21% of Democrats who hold unfavorable views of their own party, nearly six in ten say it is because the party is not fighting hard enough against Trump (59%). Over one-third say the party does not represent the interests and values of people like them (36%) or it is not progressive enough (35%). Two in ten believe the party is extreme and too-left wing (19%), and only 7% hold unfavorable views because the party is anti-religious.

在对民主党持负面看法的独立人士(占62%)中,过半数(52%,低于2026年的60%)表示原因是该党不代表像他们这样的人的利益和价值观。近半数独立人士(49%)认为民主党极端且过于左倾,23%认为其没有足够努力地对抗特朗普(低于2025年的28%),13%认为其不够进步(低于2025年的18%),17%认为其反宗教。

Of the 62% of independents who view the Democratic Party unfavorably, a slim majority say it is because the party does not represent the interest and values of people like them (52%, down from 60% in 2026). Nearly half of independents say the Democratic Party is extreme and too left-wing (49%), 23% say it is not fighting hard enough against Trump (down from 28% in 2025), 13% say it is not progressive enough (down from 18% in 2025), and 17% say it is anti-religious.

选举诚信与政治暴力 选举诚信与干预 2020年大选被窃自特朗普 近三分之一的美国人(27%,低于2024年的31%)同意“2020年大选被窃自特朗普”这一说法,而三分之二(67%)不同意。约六成共和党人(59%,低于2024年的62%)、20%的独立人士(低于2024年的27%)以及仅9%的民主党人(高于4%)相信2020年大选被窃自特朗普。

Election Integrity and Political Violence Election Integrity and Interference The 2020 Election Was Stolen from Trump Nearly one-third of Americans (27%, down from 31% in 2024) agree with the statement that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, while two-thirds disagree (67%). About six in ten Republicans (59%, down from 62% in 2024), compared with 20% of independents (down from 27% in 2024) and just 9% of Democrats (up from 4%), believe the 2020 election was stolen from Trump.

对特朗普持正面看法的共和党人同意这一说法的可能性,是持负面看法者的两倍多(69% 对 28%)。然而,对特朗普持负面看法的共和党人中同意这一说法的比例显著上升,从2024年的9%增至如今的28%。

Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more than twice as likely as those who hold unfavorable views to agree (69% vs. 28%). However, agreement among Republicans who hold unfavorable views of Trump has increased significantly, from 9% in 2024 to 28% today.

那些最信任极右翼新闻媒体(71%)和福克斯新闻(65%)的美国人,最有可能认同“2020年大选结果被窃取了”这一观点;相比之下,最信任广播媒体的人中只有50%持相同观点,最信任社交媒体的人中有37%持相同观点,最信任YouTube或播客的人中有36%持相同观点,最信任主流媒体的人中只有16%持相同观点,最信任报纸的人中只有12%持相同观点。

Americans who most trust far-right news outlets (71%) and Fox News (65%) are the most likely to agree with the statement that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, compared with half of those who most trust radio (50%), over one-third of those who most trust social media (37%) and those who most trust YouTube or podcasts (36%), just 16% of those who most trust mainstream media, and 12% of those who most trust newspapers.

白人福音派新教徒(50%,这一比例较2024年的56%有所下降)和后期圣徒教徒(49%)是唯一两个有半数成员认同“2020年大选结果被窃取了”这一观点的宗教群体;其他所有宗教群体中,持这种观点的比例都明显较低。大多数基督教民族主义者(61%)认同这一观点,而持同情态度的人中只有46%持相同观点,持怀疑态度的人中只有23%持相同观点,持反对态度的人中只有7%持相同观点。

White evangelical Protestants (50%, down from 56% in 2024) and Latter-day Saints (49%) are the only religious groups in which half agree that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump. Significantly smaller minorities of all other religious groups agree with this sentiment. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) agree that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, compared with 46% of Sympathizers, 23% of Skeptics, and 7% of Rejecters.

关于“如果对某个地方的投票存在严重欺诈行为,总统应下令联邦官员接管投票计票工作”的观点,有60%的美国人表示反对;相比之下,有35%的美国人表示赞同。大多数共和党人(58%)赞同这一观点,独立选民中只有31%表示赞同,民主党人中只有18%表示赞同。对特朗普持积极看法的共和党人比持消极看法的共和党人更有可能赞同这一观点(65% vs. 37%)。

Support for Presidential Intervention in Local Vote Counting Six in ten Americans (59%) disagree with the statement “If there are serious concerns about voter fraud in a local voting location, the president should order federal agents to seize the ballots and take over the vote counting,” compared with 35% who agree. Majorities of Republicans (58%) agree, compared with 31% of independents and just 18% of Democrats. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more likely than those who hold unfavorable views to agree (65% vs. 37%).

在这一点上,白人福音派新教徒(50%赞同,46%反对)和西班牙裔新教徒(47%赞同,51%反对)存在分歧;其他所有宗教群体的大多数成员都反对总统在接到欺诈指控后干预地方投票计票工作——其中,52%的西班牙裔天主教徒、57%的白人天主教徒和白人主流/非福音派新教徒、59%的后期圣徒教徒以及63%的其他非基督教徒都持反对意见。黑人新教徒(74%)、无宗教信仰的美国人(73%)和犹太裔美国人(71%)最有可能反对这一观点。

White evangelical Protestants (50% agree; 46% disagree) and Hispanic Protestants (47% agree; 51% disagree) are divided on this question. Majorities of all other religious groups disagree that the president should interfere in local vote counting in response to fraud allegations, including 52% of Hispanic Catholics, 57% of both white Catholics and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, 59% of Latter-day Saints, and 63% of other non-Christians. Black Protestants (74%), unaffiliated Americans (73%), and Jewish Americans (71%) are the most likely to disagree.

大多数基督教民族主义追随者(65%)和怀疑者(52%)同意,总统应针对舞弊指控干预地方选票统计,相比之下,同情者中有34%同意,拒绝者中有15%同意。

Most Christian nationalism Adherents (65%) and Skeptics (52%) agree the president should interfere in local vote counting in response to fraud allegations, compared with 34% of Sympathizers and 15% of Adherents.

关于特朗普可能推迟2026年中期选举的支持情况:十分之七的美国人(70%)不同意“如果各州无法控制选民舞弊,总统应推迟2026年国会中期选举”这一说法,而24%表示同意。共和党人(34%,低于2025年的40%)比无党派人士(20%)和民主党人(16%)更倾向于支持可能推迟2026年中期选举。对特朗普持好感的共和党人比持负面看法的共和党人更倾向于同意(37% 对 26%)。

Support for Trump Possibly Postponing the 2026 Midterm Elections Seven in ten Americans (70%) disagree with the statement “If states can’t get voter fraud under control, the president should postpone the 2026 midterm elections for Congress,” compared with 24% who agree. Republicans (34%, down from 40% in 2025) are more likely than independents (20%), and Democrats (16%) to support a potential postponement of the 2026 midterms. Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are more likely than those who hold unfavorable views to agree (37% vs. 26%).

极少有有宗教信仰的美国人支持可能推迟2026年中期选举。西班牙裔新教徒(36%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(31%)最有可能同意应推迟选举,其次是白人福音派新教徒(28%)、其他非基督教宗教信徒(27%)和后期圣徒(25%)。白人主流/非福音派新教徒(23%)、白人天主教徒(21%)、黑人新教徒(20%)、无宗教归属的美国人(17%)和犹太裔美国人(16%)中,同意者约占四分之一或更少。

Few religious Americans support a potential postponement of the 2026 midterm elections. Hispanic Protestants (36%) and Hispanic Catholics (31%) are the most likely to agree that the elections should be postponed, followed by white evangelical Protestants (28%), members of other non-Christian religions (27%) and Latter-day Saints (25%). About one-quarter or fewer of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (23%), white Catholics (21%), Black Protestants (20%), religiously unaffiliated Americans (17%), and Jewish Americans (16%) agree.

近半数基督教民族主义追随者(48%)同意,如果选民舞弊得不到控制,应推迟2026年中期选举,相比之下,同情者为32%,怀疑者为23%,拒绝者为9%。

Nearly half of Christian nationalism Adherents (48%) agree with postponing the 2026 midterm elections if voter fraud is not under control, compared with 32% of Sympathizers, 23% of Skeptics, and 9% of Rejecters.

美国选举和投票中的种族歧视:近六成美国人(58%)同意“种族歧视在美国当今的选举和投票中仍是一个严重问题”这一说法,而37%表示不同意。民主党人(86%)和无党派人士(59%)中多数同意,共和党人仅有29%同意。大多数共和党人(68%)不同意这一说法。

Racial Discrimination in U.S. Elections and Voting Nearly six in ten Americans (58%) agree with the statement “Racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today,” compared with 37% who disagree. Majorities of Democrats (86%) and independents (59%) agree, compared with just 29% of Republicans. Most Republicans (68%) disagree with this statement.

白人基督教群体中最不认同“种族歧视仍是美国选举和投票中一个严重问题”的比例最高:其中,47%的白人主流/非福音派新教徒、45%的白人天主教徒、43%的后期圣徒(Latter-day Saints)以及34%的白人福音派新教徒持这种观点。相比之下,非基督徒以及有色人种的基督徒普遍认同这一观点——其中黑人新教徒(85%)、非基督徒(76%)、无宗教信仰者(73%)、西班牙裔天主教徒(71%)、西班牙裔新教徒(65%)以及犹太美国人(65%)都持相同看法。

White Christian groups are the least likely to agree that racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today, including 47% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, 45% of white Catholics, 43% of Latter-day Saints, and 34% of white evangelical Protestants. By contrast, solid majorities of non-Christians and Christians of color agree, including Black Protestants (85%), non-Christians (76%), unaffiliated (73%), Hispanic Catholics (71%), Hispanic Protestants (65%), and Jewish Americans (65%).

大多数反对基督教民族主义的人(86%)以及对基督教民族主义持怀疑态度的人(60%)也认为种族歧视仍是美国选举和投票中的一个严重问题;而支持基督教民族主义的人中只有43%持这种观点,其追随者中这一比例更低(仅为40%)。

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (86%) and Skeptics (60%) agree that racial discrimination remains a serious problem in U.S. elections and voting today, compared with 43% of Sympathizers and 40% of Adherents. The Biggest Problem in U.S. Elections In 2026, 46% of Americans say they agree with the statement “The biggest problem in U.S. elections today is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote,” while 50% agree with the statement “The biggest problem in U.S. elections today is eligible voters being denied the right to vote.”[5] The partisan divides on this question are stark.

关于2026年美国选举的最大问题,46%的美国人认为“当前美国选举的最大问题是那些没有投票资格的人仍在投票”,另有50%的人认为“当前美国选举的最大问题是符合条件的选民被剥夺了投票权”。在这个问题上,党派分歧非常明显:大约82%的共和党人支持第一种观点,而大多数民主党人(80%)则支持第二种观点。独立选民更倾向于认为“当前美国选举的最大问题是符合条件的选民被剥夺了投票权”(52%),而非“那些没有投票资格的人仍在投票”(43%)。

Approximately eight in ten Republicans (82%) agree with the first statement, while most Democrats (80%) agree with the second statement. Independents are more likely to agree that the biggest problem in U.S. elections today is eligible voters being denied the right to vote (52%) than people casting votes who are not eligible to vote (43%).

大多数白人基督教团体认为,最大的问题是不具备资格的人投了票,其中包括 74% 的白人福音派新教徒,以及 58% 的白人非福音派/新教徒、白人天主教徒和后期圣徒。相比之下,大多数有色人种基督徒和非基督徒同意“最大的问题是符合资格的选民被剥夺了投票权”这一说法,其中包括 79% 的黑人新教徒、64% 的无宗教归属者和其他非基督徒、59% 的犹太裔美国人,以及 58% 的西班牙裔天主教徒。

Majorities of white Christian groups agree that the biggest problem is people casting votes who are not eligible to vote, including 74% of white evangelical Protestants and 58% of white non-evangelical/Protestants, white Catholics, and Latter-day Saints. By contrast, most Christians of color and non-Christians agree with the statement that the biggest problem is eligible voters being denied the right to vote, including 79% of Black Protestants, 64% of both unaffiliated and other non-Christians, 59% of Jewish Americans, and 58% of Hispanic Catholics.

西班牙裔新教徒意见分歧(51% 对 47%)。国会议员和最高法院大法官改革最高法院大法官任期限制四分之三的美国人(74%)同意美国最高法院大法官应实行任期限制,其中包括 88% 的民主党人、74% 的无党派人士和 66% 的共和党人。当选官员利用权力为自己或家人谋取经济利益不足十分之一的美国人(7%)认为当选官员利用公职为自己或家庭成员谋取经济利益应当合法,而绝大多数美国人(88%)认为这在所有或大多数情况下都应当违法,其中超过七成(71%)表示在所有情况下都应当违法。

Hispanic Protestants are divided (51% vs. 47%). Reforms for Members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices Term Limits for Supreme Court Justices Three-quarters of Americans (74%) agree there should be term limits for U.S. Supreme Court justices, including 88% of Democrats, 74% of independents, and 66% of Republicans. Elected Officials Using Their Power to Financially Benefit Themselves or Their Family Less than one in ten Americans (7%) believe it should be legal for elected officials to use their public office to financially benefit themselves or members of their family, while the vast majority of Americans (88%) believe this should be illegal in all or most cases, including over seven in ten who say it should be illegal in all cases (71%).

反对意见跨越党派,超过十分之九的民主党人(92%)、共和党人(91%)和无党派人士(91%)认为,政客不应被允许利用政治权力为自己或家人谋取经济利益。

Opposition is bipartisan, with over nine in ten Democrats (92%), Republicans (91%), and independents (91%) believing politicians should not be allowed to use their political power to financially benefit themselves or their family.

民选官员绘制选区地图以谋取党派优势 只有极少数美国人支持民选官员绘制选区地图以使本党获益,仅有十分之一的美国人(12%)认为这在所有或大多数情况下应当合法;超过八成美国人(83%)认为这应当违法,其中近六成(58%)认为在所有情况下都应当违法。尽管在这一问题上两党高度一致,但共和党人(81%)反对党派划票的比例低于民主党人(87%)和无党派人士(86%)。

Elected Officials Drawing Voting Maps for Party Advantage Few Americans support elected officials drawing voting maps to give their own political party an advantage, with only one in ten Americans (12%) believing it should be legal in all or most cases; over eight in ten Americans (83%) say it should be illegal, including nearly six in ten believing it should be illegal in all cases (58%). Though there is strong bipartisan agreement on this issue, Republicans (81%) are less likely to oppose partisan gerrymandering than Democrats (87%) and independents (86%).

民选官员任内买卖个股 仅有15%的美国人认为民选官员任内买卖个股应当合法,而八成美国人(80%)认为应当违法,其中54%认为在所有情况下都应当违法。各党派群体的多数都认为这种做法应当违法,但共和党人(79%)同意这一观点的比例在统计学意义上低于民主党人(84%)和无党派人士(83%)。

Elected Officials Buying or Selling Stocks While in Office Only 15% of Americans say it should be legal for elected officials to buy or sell individual stocks while in office, while eight in ten Americans (80%) say it should be illegal, including 54% who believe it should be illegal in all cases. Majorities of each partisan group say this practice should be illegal, though Republicans (79%) are statistically less likely than Democrats (84%) and independents (83%) to agree.

价值观:共情、归属感与信任 共情是社会的益处还是威胁 近七成美国人(68%)认为共情是“有助于建设健康社会的基础道德价值观”,而不足三成(27%)认为共情“当其导致人们偏离遵循上帝真理建设社会时,可能变得危险”。绝大多数民主党人(84%)同意共情有助于建设健康社会,七成无党派人士(70%)和过半数共和党人(54%)也持相同看法。

Values: Empathy, Belonging, and Trust Empathy as a Benefit or Threat to Society Nearly seven in ten Americans (68%) believe empathy is a “foundational moral value that helps build a healthy society,” compared with less than three in ten who believe empathy “can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God’s truth” (27%). The vast majority of Democrats (84%) agree empathy helps build a healthy society, while seven in ten independents (70%) and a slim majority of Republicans (54%) agree.[6] Republicans who hold favorable views of Trump are split in their views on empathy.

[6] 对特朗普持好感的共和党人在共情问题上意见分歧。约半数人支持共情是基础道德价值观的说法(49%),近半数人认为共情可能具有危险性(48%)。相比之下,近四分之三对特朗普持负面看法的共和党人(72%)视共情为基础道德价值观。

About half side with the statement that empathy is a foundational moral value (49%), and nearly as many believe empathy can be dangerous (48%). By contrast, nearly three-quarters of Republicans who view Trump unfavorably (72%) view empathy as a foundational moral value.

除了白人福音派新教徒(42%)之外,大约三分之二或更多的主要宗教团体都认为“同理心”是构建健康社会的基本道德价值观。这些群体包括:约八成没有宗教信仰的美国人(83%)、其他非基督教宗教的信徒(80%)以及犹太裔美国人(77%)。相比之下,大多数白人福音派新教徒(54%)认为,当同理心使人偏离“以神的真理”为指导的社会建设道路时,它可能会带来负面影响。

With the exception of white evangelical Protestants (42%), around two-thirds or more of all major religious groups believe that empathy is a foundational moral value for a healthy society, including about eight in ten religiously unaffiliated Americans (83%), members of other non-Christian religions (80%), and Jewish Americans (77%). By contrast, a majority of white evangelical Protestants (54%) believe empathy can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided by God’s truth.

调查还发现,在基督教民族主义者中,对同理心社会价值的怀疑情绪较为强烈:六成基督教民族主义者(59%)认为,当同理心使人偏离“以神的真理”为指导的社会建设道路时,它可能会带来危险;其中有一半的人对此观点表示强烈赞同(50%)。相比之下,几乎所有反对基督教民族主义的人(94%)都认为同理心是构建健康社会的基本道德价值观;而持怀疑态度的人中只有76%持有这种观点,同情者中这一比例为52%,支持者中这一比例为38%。

The survey also finds that skepticism about the social value of empathy is strong among Christian nationalism Adherents. Six in ten Adherents (59%) believe empathy can become dangerous when it leads people away from building a society guided on God’s truth, with half strongly agreeing with the statement (50%). By contrast, nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (94%) say empathy is a foundational moral value for a healthy society, compared with 76% of Skeptics, 52% of Sympathizers, and 38% of Adherents.

关于“是否愿意搬到更符合自己价值观的国家”的问题,有三分之一的美国人(30%)表示在过去两年中认真考虑过搬家;而三分之二的人(66%)从未考虑过这个问题。在过去两年中,超过四成的民主党人(43%)考虑过搬家,独立选民中这一比例为32%,共和党人中这一比例仅为14%。

Moving to a Different Country that Aligns With My Values Three in ten Americans (30%) say that over the last two years, they have seriously thought about moving to a different country that would be more aligned with their values, while two-thirds have not considered this (66%). More than four in ten Democrats (43%) have considered moving to a different country in the last two years, compared with 32% of independents and only 14% of Republicans.

大约四成没有宗教信仰的美国人(42%)和其他非基督教宗教的信徒(39%)考虑过搬到更符合自己价值观的国家。大约三分之一的非白人基督教群体也考虑过搬家,其次是四分之一的白人基督教群体和犹太裔美国人;而只有14%的白人福音派新教徒考虑过搬家。

Around four in ten religiously unaffiliated Americans (42%) and members other non-Christian religions (39%) have considered moving to a different country that is more aligned with their values. About one-third of non-white Christian groups have also considered this, followed by one-quarter of most white Christian groups and Jewish Americans.

总之,不同宗教群体对同理心在社会中的价值的看法存在显著差异。

Only 14% of white evangelical Protestants have thought about moving to a different country that would more align with their values.

近半数“基督教民族主义反对者”(46%)认同,过去两年里他们曾认真考虑过移居到一个更符合自己价值观的国家,相比之下,“怀疑者”中这一比例为29%,“同情者”为23%,“拥护者”为21%。

Nearly half of Christian nationalism Rejecters (46%) agree that over the last two years, they have seriously thought about moving to a different country that would be more aligned with their values, compared with 29% of Skeptics, 23% of Sympathizers, and 21% of Adherents.

美国白人表示曾考虑移居他国的比例低于黑人、亚裔美国人和太平洋岛民以及西班牙裔美国人。年长的美国人表示曾考虑移居到一个更符合自己价值观的国家的比例也低于年轻美国人。

White Americans are less likely than Black, AAPI, and Hispanic Americans to say they have considered moving to a different country. Older Americans are also less likely than younger Americans to say they have thought about moving to a different country that better aligns with their values.

对不同群体的信任总体而言,多数美国人对社区内的各类人群抱有信任。约四分之三的美国人对邻居(77%)、信仰其他宗教的人(74%)以及在美国境外出生的人(72%)有一定程度或完全的信任。六成美国人对支持其他政党的人抱有信任(61%),但不到半数的人表示信任初次见面的人(48%信任,46%不信任)。

Trust in Different Groups Overall, majorities of Americans trust varying groups of people that are within their communities. Around three-quarters of Americans somewhat or completely trust people in their neighborhood (77%), those of another religion (74%), and those born outside of the United States (72%). Six in ten trust people who support another political party (61%) but less than half say they trust people they meet for the first time (48% trust vs. 46% do not trust).

共和党人信任邻居的比例高于民主党人和独立人士(分别为84%、80%和75%),但信任信仰其他宗教的人(73%对81%和76%)或在美国境外出生的人(66%对82%和73%)的比例较低。共和党人不信任在美国境外出生的人的可能性几乎是民主党人的两倍,比独立人士高出10个百分点(30%对16%和21%)。民主党人信任支持其他政党的人的比例较低(56%,独立人士为66%,共和党人为64%),而独立人士信任初次见面的人的比例较低(47%,民主党人为54%,共和党人为52%)。

Republicans are more likely to trust people in their neighborhood than Democrats and independents (84% vs. 80% and 75%, respectively) but are less likely to trust those of another religion (73% vs. 81% and 76%) or those born outside the U.S. (66% vs. 82% and 73%). Republicans are nearly twice as likely as Democrats and 10 percentage points more likely as independents to not trust people who were born outside the U.S. (30% vs. 16% and 21%). Democrats are less likely to trust those of another political party (56% vs. 66% of independents and 64% of Republicans), while independents are less likely to trust people they meet for the first time (47% vs. 54% of Democrats and 52% of Republicans).

信任度与年龄组呈正相关,最年轻的美国人对各群体的信任度最低,最年长的美国人信任度最高。按党派划分,50岁以上的美国人比50岁以下的人更可能信任支持另一个政党的人。年龄差距最大的是民主党人:50岁及以上者中有65%信任支持另一个政党的人,而50岁以下者中这一比例为49%。独立人士(74%对61%)和共和党人(66%对60%)的年龄差距较小。

Trust is positively correlated with age groups, with the youngest Americans showing the least amount of trust for each group and the oldest with the most. Across partisan groups, Americans over age 50 are more likely than those under 50 to trust people who support another political party. The largest age gap is among Democrats: 65% of those age 50 or older trust people who support another political party, compared with 49% of those under age 50. Smaller age gaps appear among independents (74% vs. 61%) and Republicans (66% vs. 60%).

对移民的看法与移民政策 对移民的看法 约三分之一的美国人认同所谓的“大替代理论”,即认为“移民正在入侵我们的国家并取代我们的文化和族裔背景”(35%),而61%的人不认同。自2019年首次提出该问题以来,看法一直保持稳定,共和党人(66%)认同这一说法的可能性显著高于独立人士(30%)或民主党人(14%)。

Perceptions of Immigrants and Immigration Policy Perceptions of Immigrants Around one-third of Americans agree with the so-called “great replacement theory,” or the belief that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background” (35%), while 61% disagree. Views have held steady since the question was first asked in 2019, with Republicans (66%) significantly more likely than either independents (30%) or Democrats (14%) to agree with this statement.

白人福音派新教徒(61%)是唯一多数认同移民正在入侵该国的宗教群体。不到半数的白人天主教徒(47%)和白人主流/非福音派新教徒(44%)认同“大替代理论”,此外还有不到四成的后期圣徒(39%)、约三成的犹太裔美国人(34%)、拉美裔新教徒(29%)和其他非基督教宗教成员(28%)、不到四分之一的黑人新教徒(23%)和无宗教信仰的美国人(23%),以及仅16%的拉美裔天主教徒。

White evangelical Protestants (61%) are the only religious group where the majority agree that immigrants are invading the country. Less than half of white Catholics (47%) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (44%) agree with the “great replacement theory,” as well as less than four in ten Latter-day Saints (39%), around three in ten Jewish Americans (34%), Hispanic Protestants (29%), and members of other non-Christian religions (28%), less than one-quarter of Black Protestants (23%) and religiously unaffiliated Americans (23%), and only 16% of Hispanic Catholics.

在符合基督教民族主义“拥护者”标准的美国人中,近七成(69%)认同“大替代理论”,相比之下,“同情者”中为57%,“怀疑者”中为32%,“拒绝者”中仅为9%。

Nearly seven in ten Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (69%) agree with the “great replacement theory,” compared with 57% of Sympathizers, 32% of Skeptics, and just 9% of Rejecters.

年轻美国人普遍不认同“移民正在入侵美国并改变其文化和种族构成”这一观点:18至29岁的人群中只有26%持这种观点,30至49岁的人群中这一比例为30%;而50至64岁的人群中这一比例为41%,65岁及以上的人群中这一比例则高达43%。

Younger Americans are significantly less likely than older Americans to agree that immigrants are invading the country and replacing its cultural and ethnic background: 26% of those ages 18-29 and 30% of those ages 30-49 agree, compared with 41% of those ages 50-64 and 43% of those ages 65 and older.

关于移民的权利与保护以及他们的入籍途径:大约六成(59%)的美国人认为,只要符合某些条件,非法居住在美国的移民应该有机会获得公民身份。超过一成的人表示更希望这些非法移民能够获得永久居留权而非公民身份(13%);另有四分之一的人认为所有非法移民都应被识别并驱逐出境(24%)。自2013年以来,美国人对非法移民入籍途径的支持率基本保持稳定——2019年时支持率最高(67%),2024年时最低(56%)。

Rights and Protections for Immigrants Pathway to Citizenship Approximately six in ten Americans (59%) say that immigrants living in the United States illegally should be given a way to become citizens, provided they meet certain requirements. More than one in ten say they would prefer undocumented immigrants to be eligible for permanent residency status but not citizenship (13%), and one in four say all immigrants living in the country illegally should be identified and deported (24%). These levels of support for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants has remained remarkably consistent since 2013, with a high of 67% in 2019 and a low of 56% in 2024.

民主党人对非法移民入籍途径的支持度有所上升,从2013年首次调查时的71%上升至现在的79%;相比之下,共和党的支持度则持续下降,从2013年的53%降至目前的37%。值得注意的是,共和党人支持识别并驱逐非法移民的比例自2013年以来稳步上升,从32%升至2024年的最高点57%,随后在2025年和2026年分别降至约50%(48%)。独立选民的态度则基本保持不变(2013年为64%)。值得注意的是,过去十年中,两党在这问题上的分歧显著扩大,从2013年的18个百分点增加到2026年的42个百分点。

Democrats (79%) have grown more supportive of a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, with support increasing from 71% in 2013 when the question was first asked. By contrast, Republicans have become consistently less supportive, from a high of 53% in 2013 to 37% today. Notably, support among Republicans for identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants has steadily increased since 2013, from 32% to a high of 57% in 2024 before dropping to around half in 2025 (48%) and 2026 (50%). Independents (61%) have remained mostly consistent (64% in 2013). Notably, the partisan gap on this question has more than doubled over the last decade, from 18 percentage points in 2013 to 42 percentage points in 2026.

大约七成的西班牙裔天主教徒(77%)、黑人群体中的新教徒(73%)、西班牙裔新教徒(70%)以及无宗教归属的美国人(68%)支持允许无证移民获得公民身份;此外,大多数白人主流新教徒(55%)、其他非基督教宗教的信徒(55%)、白人天主教徒(54%)以及犹太裔美国人(54%)也持相同观点。不过,后期圣徒教会(Latter-day Saints)的成员对此问题的态度存在分歧——只有44%的后期圣徒教会成员支持这一政策。

Around seven in ten Hispanic Catholics (77%), Black Protestants (73%), Hispanic Protestants (70%), and unaffiliated Americans (68%) support allowing undocumented immigrants to become citizens, followed by majorities of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (55%), members of other non-Christian religions (55%), white Catholics (54%), and Jewish Americans (54%); Latter-day Saints (50%) are divided. White evangelical Protestants (44%) are the only religious group without majority support.

在过去十年中,白人福音派新教徒对“识别并驱逐无证移民”的支持率呈上升趋势:从2013年的30%升至2024年的53%,随后又降至2026年的47%。

Support among white evangelical Protestants for identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants has trended upward over the past decade, from 30% in 2013, to a peak at 53% in 2024, and down to 47% in 2026.

八成的反对基督教民族主义的人(78%)以及六成的持怀疑态度的人(62%)支持允许无证移民获得公民身份;相比之下,只有48%的基督教民族主义支持者以及39%的该主义追随者持反对意见。

Eight in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (78%) and six in ten Skeptics (62%) support allowing undocumented immigrants to become citizens, compared with 48% of Christian nationalism Sympathizers and 39% of Adherents.

关于“允许非法进入美国的儿童获得公民身份”的问题,六成的美国人(59%)支持这一政策,而36%的人反对。这一政策的支持率在2020年达到最高点(66%),自2018年首次被调查以来,2024年降至最低点(52%)。八成的民主党人(80%)支持这一政策,独立选民的支持率为62%,而共和党人的支持率则低于40%(37%)。

Allowing Children Brought to the U.S. Illegally to Become Citizens Six in ten Americans (59%) favor allowing immigrants brought to United States as children to gain legal resident status, while 36% oppose. Support for this policy peaked in 2020 at 66% and was at its lowest in 2024 at 52% since the question was first asked in 2018. Eight in ten Democrats (80%) support this policy, compared with 62% of independents and less than four in ten Republicans (37%).

绝大多数西班牙裔天主教徒(83%)、犹太裔美国人(71%)、无宗教归属的美国人(71%)、黑人群体中的新教徒(70%)以及西班牙裔新教徒(69%)都支持允许非法进入美国的儿童获得合法居留身份;其他非基督教宗教的信徒(58%)和白人主流新教徒(52%)也大多支持这一政策,不过白人天主教徒中只有约一半(50%)支持该政策。后期圣徒教会(47%)和白人福音派新教徒(41%)则未达到多数支持这一政策的比例。

Solid majorities of Hispanic Catholics (83%), Jewish Americans (71%), unaffiliated Americans (71%), Black Protestants (70%), and Hispanic Protestants (69%) favor allowing children brought to the country illegally to gain resident status. Smaller majorities of members of other non-Christian religions (58%) and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (52%), as well as half of white Catholics (50%), also support this policy. Latter-day Saints (47%) and white evangelical Protestants (41%) do not reach majority support.

绝大多数基督教民族主义“拒绝派”(82%)和“怀疑派”(64%)赞成允许童年时期被带入美国的非法移民获得合法居留身份,而“同情派”和“追随派”分别只有48%和35%持此观点。

Most Christian nationalism Rejecters (82%) and Skeptics (64%) favor allowing immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally as children to gain legal resident status, compared with 48% of Sympathizers and 35% of Adherents.

出生公民权 三分之二的美国人(65%)赞成“美国宪法现行的保障,即所有在美国出生的儿童均自动获得美国公民身份,无论其父母的公民身份如何”,30%表示反对。大多数民主党人(88%)和独立人士(68%)一贯支持出生公民权,共和党人仅为40%,自2025年3月首次提问以来显著下降。[7] 大多数宗教群体中强有力的多数派支持出生公民权,包括84%的西班牙裔天主教徒、82%的黑人新教徒、76%的无宗教归属美国人、75%的犹太裔美国人、74%的西班牙裔新教徒、71%的其他非基督教宗教成员、62%的后期圣徒、60%的白人主流/非福音派新教徒,以及55%的白人天主教徒。

Birthright Citizenship Two-thirds of Americans (65%) favor the “U.S. Constitution’s existing guarantee that all children who are born in the United States are automatically granted U.S. citizenship, regardless of their parents’ citizenship status,” while 30% oppose. Most Democrats (88%) and independents (68%) consistently favor birthright citizenship, compared with 40% of Republicans, who have declined significantly since the question was first asked in March 2025.[7] Strong majorities of most religious groups support birthright citizenship, including 84% of Hispanic Catholics, 82% Black Protestants, 76% of unaffiliated Americans, 75% of Jewish Americans, 74% of Hispanic Protestants, 71% of members of other non-Christian religions, 62% of Latter-day Saints, 60% of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants, and 55% of white Catholics.

白人福音派新教徒中支持出生公民权的不足半数(45%),较2025年3月首次提问时的49%有所下降。

Less than half of white evangelical Protestants (45%) also support birthright citizenship, down from 49% since the question was first asked in March 2025.

十分之九的基督教民族主义“拒绝派”(89%)支持出生公民权,而“怀疑派”、“同情派”和“追随派”分别为70%、57%和41%。

Nine in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (89%) support birthright citizenship, compared with 70% of Skeptics, 57% of Sympathizers, and 41% of Adherents.

年轻美国人比年长美国人更倾向于维护宪法对出生公民权的保障:18-29岁(71%)和30-49岁(70%)年龄段各有七成左右表示赞成,而50-64岁和65岁及以上年龄段分别为59%和60%。

Younger Americans are significantly more likely than older Americans to favor preserving the Constitution’s guarantee of birthright citizenship: Seven in ten each among those ages 18-29 (71%) and 30-49 (70%) favor this, compared with 59% of those ages 50-64 and 60% of those ages 65 and older.

为无证移民设立的移民与执法拘留营 超过六成美国人(62%)不同意联邦政府将非法居留在美国的移民关押在拘留营中直至其可被驱逐出境,而三分之一(33%)表示同意。共和党人(62%)同意这一政策的可能性远高于独立人士(28%)或民主党人(16%),且共和党人的观点出现了最显著的变化。2025年9月,69%的共和党人同意该政策。然而到2026年2月,支持率上升至73%,随后降至如今的62%。独立人士和民主党人在此期间变化不大。

Immigration and Law Enforcement Internment Camps for Undocumented Immigrants More than six in ten Americans (62%) disagree that the federal government should detain immigrants who are in the country illegally in internment camps until they can be deported, while one-third agree (33%). Republicans (62%) are far more likely to agree with this policy, compared with either independents (28%) or Democrats (16%), and Republicans have seen the most significant shifts in their views. In September 2025, 69% of Republicans agreed with the policy. However, by February 2026, support increased to 73%, before declining to 62% today. Independents and Democrats have seen little change in this timeframe.

白人福音派新教徒(53%)是唯一一个多数成员同意将无证移民关押在拘留营直至其可被驱逐出境的宗教群体。约四成白人天主教徒(45%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(41%)和后期圣徒(39%)同意这一政策,其次是约三分之一的其它非基督教宗教成员(35%)、四分之一的黑人新教徒(29%)、美国犹太人(27%)、西班牙裔新教徒(23%)和无宗教归属的美国人(22%),以及仅16%的西班牙裔天主教徒。

White evangelical Protestants (53%) are the only religious group where the majority agree with placing undocumented immigrants into internment camps until they can be deported. Around four in ten white Catholics (45%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (41%), and Latter-day Saints (39%) agree with this policy, followed by around one-third of members of other non-Christian religions (35%), one-quarter of Black Protestants (29%), Jewish Americans (27%), Hispanic Protestants (23%), and unaffiliated Americans (22%), and only 16% of Hispanic Catholics.

大多数基督教民族主义拥护者(62%)和同情者(51%)同意应将无证移民关押在拘留营中,相比之下,怀疑者中为32%,拒绝者中仅为11%。

Most Christian nationalism Adherents (62%) and Sympathizers (51%) agree that undocumented immigrants should be placed in internment camps, compared with 32% of Skeptics and only 11% of Rejecters.

剥夺公民身份并在被视为对国家构成威胁时驱逐出境 大多数美国人(54%)反对在认定美国公民对国家构成威胁时剥夺其公民身份并将其驱逐出境,而41%支持这一政策。近六成共和党人(57%)支持这一政策,相比之下,独立人士(37%)和民主党人(31%)中支持者不足四成。

Stripping Citizenship and Deporting If Deemed a Threat to the Country Most Americans (54%) oppose stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country, while 41% favor this policy. Nearly six in ten Republicans (57%) favor this policy, compared with fewer than four in ten independents (37%) and Democrats (31%).

大约一半的白人基督教团体支持剥夺被视为对国家构成威胁者的公民身份并将其驱逐出境,而其他宗教团体或无宗教信仰者中支持这一做法的比例要低得多。

Approximately half of white Christian groups favor stripping citizenship and deporting those deemed a threat to the country, compared with far fewer other religious groups or the religiously unaffiliated.

约三分之二符合基督教民族主义“追随者”标准的美国人(65%)和54%的“同情者”支持这一政策,相比之下,“怀疑者”中为42%,“拒绝者”中为23%。

About two-thirds of Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (65%) and 54% of Sympathizers favor this policy, compared with 42% of Skeptics and 23% of Rejecters.

性别与妇女权利 废除妇女投票权 近九成美国人(87%)不同意废除确立妇女投票权的宪法第十九修正案,而不到十分之一的美国人(8%)表示同意。在党派归属、宗教、基督教民族主义群体以及所有其他关键人口统计特征中,均存在压倒性支持维持第十九修正案的态势。

Gender and Women’s Rights Repealing Women’s Right to Vote Nearly nine in ten Americans (87%) disagree with repealing the 19th Amendment of the Constitution, which established the right for women to vote, while less than one in ten Americans (8%) agree. Across partisanship, religion, Christian nationalism groups, and all other key demographics, there is overwhelming support for maintaining the 19th Amendment.

社会变得过于软弱和女性化 不足四成美国人(38%)同意整个社会变得过于软弱和女性化,而多数人(57%)持不同意见。尽管自2011年首次提问以来,全体美国人的同意比例变化不大,但党派分歧已显著扩大,从2011年的23个百分点增至如今的48个百分点。现在约三分之二的共和党人(65%)同意社会变得过于软弱和女性化,高于2011年的53%;仅17%的民主党人同意,低于2011年的30%。无党派人士随时间保持一致(2011年为37%,如今为39%)。

Society Has Become Too Soft and Feminine Less than four in ten Americans (38%) agree that society as a whole has become too soft and feminine, while a majority (57%) disagree. Though there has been little shift in agreement among all Americans since the question was first asked in 2011, the partisan divide has widened significantly, from 23 points in 2011 to 48 points today. Around two-thirds of Republicans (65%) now agree society has become too soft and feminine, up from 53% in 2011; only 17% of Democrats agree, down from 30% in 2011. Independents have remained consistent over time (37% in 2011 vs. 39% today).

男性比女性更有13个百分点倾向于认为社会变得过于软弱和女性化(45% 对 32%)。

Men are 13 percentage points more likely than women to believe society has become too soft and feminine (45% vs. 32%).

白人福音派新教徒是唯一一个中有多数人(58%)认为社会变得过于“软弱”和“女性化”的宗教群体。相比之下,白人天主教徒中只有不到一半的人(48%)持相同观点;主流/非福音派新教徒中约有四成(43%)持这种观点,西班牙裔新教徒中也有约四成(42%)持相同观点;后期圣徒教徒中这一比例为39%;其他非基督教宗教的信徒中这一比例为33%;无宗教信仰的美国人中这一比例为29%,犹太裔美国人中这一比例为28%,黑人新教徒中这一比例为27%。

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group where the majority (58%) agree that society has become too soft and feminine. Less than half of white Catholics (48%), around four in ten white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (43%), Hispanic Protestants (42%), and Latter-day Saints (39%), one-third of Hispanic Catholics (35%) and members of other non-Christian religions (33%), and less than three in ten unaffiliated Americans (29%), Jewish Americans (28%), and Black Protestants (27%) also agree.

在支持基督教民族主义的人中,有三分之二(66%)认为社会过于“软弱”和“女性化”;而在同情基督教民族主义的人中,这一比例为59%。相比之下,持怀疑态度的人中这一比例为39%,完全反对基督教民族主义的人中这一比例仅为14%。

Two-thirds of Christian nationalism Adherents (66%) and six in ten Sympathizers (59%) agree society is too soft and feminine, compared with 39% of Skeptics and just 14% of Rejecters. Men and Women Should Stick with Jobs and Tasks Naturally Suited for Them Four in ten Americans (39%) agree society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, while a slim majority (55%) disagree; agreement has remained stable since the question was first asked in 2016.

关于“男女应从事与其天生适合的工作和任务”的观点:有四成(39%)的美国人认为,当男女各自从事与其天生适合的工作和任务时,社会会变得更好;而持反对意见的人仅占少数(55%)。自2016年首次提出这一问题以来,这一观点的认同率基本保持稳定。在党派立场方面,分歧已经从2016年的13个百分点增加到如今的29个百分点。

Partisan divide on this stance has more than doubled from 13 points in 2016 to 29 points today. The majority of Republicans (56%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, up from 44% in 2016.

大多数共和党人(56%)支持这一观点,而这一比例在2016年为44%;无党派人士中持赞同意见的比例下降至38%(2016年为43%);民主党人的支持率也略有下降,从2016年的31%降至如今的27%。

Less than four in ten independents (38%) agree, down from 43% in 2016. Democrats have decreased slightly in agreement, from 31% in 2016 to 27% today.

此外,超过四成(44%)的男性认为男女应从事与其天生适合的工作和任务,而女性中持这一观点的比例为35%。

More than four in ten men (44%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for, compared with 35% of women.

大多数白人福音派新教徒(54%)、西班牙裔新教徒(54%)以及西班牙裔天主教徒(51%)认为,当男女从事自己天生适合的工作和任务时,社会会变得更加和谐。这一观点在后期圣徒教徒(44%)、白人天主教徒(42%)、非福音派白人新教徒(38%)、黑人新教徒(38%)以及其他非基督教宗教的信徒中也有相当高的支持率(37%);同时,30%的犹太美国人和27%的无宗教信仰的美国人也持相同观点。

Slim majorities of white evangelical Protestants (54%), Hispanic Protestants (54%) and Hispanic Catholics (51%) believe society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for. This is followed by about four in ten Latter-day Saints (44%), white Catholics (42%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (38%), Black Protestants (38%), and members of other non-Christian religions (37%), as well as three in ten Jewish Americans (30%) and unaffiliated Americans (27%).

在支持“男女应从事自己天生适合的工作和任务”的观点中,70%的基督教民族主义者(69%)和60%的同情者(58%)表示赞同,而只有39%的持怀疑态度的人以及16%的反对者持这种观点。

Seven in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (69%) and six in ten Sympathizers (58%) agree men and women should stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited with, compared with 39% of Skeptics and only 16% of Rejecters.

这种观点的支持率随着年龄的增长而上升:18至29岁的美国人中有34%表示赞同,30至49岁的人群中这一比例为39%,50至64岁的人群中为40%,65岁及以上的人群中为43%。值得注意的是,18至29岁的年轻男性(43%)比同龄的年轻女性(25%)更倾向于认为这种安排会使社会变得更好。这一18个百分点的差距几乎是其他所有年龄段中8至9个百分点差距的两倍。

Agreement that society is better off when men and women stick to the jobs and tasks they are naturally suited for increases by age: 34% of Americans ages 18-29 agree, compared with 39% of those ages 30-49, 40% of those ages 50-64, and 43% of those ages 65 and older. However, young men ages 18-29 (43%) are significantly more likely than young women ages 18-29 (25%) to agree that society is better off when men and women stick to naturally suited jobs and tasks. Notably, this 18-point gap is roughly double the 8-to-9-point gap seen in every older age group.

美国:一个可靠的邻国,还是一个强大的国家?不到三分之二的美国人(64%)赞同这样的观点:“我希望美国被视为一个可靠的邻国,只有在万不得已的情况下才会使用武力”;而大约三分之一的美国人(32%)则赞同这样的观点:“我希望美国被视为一个强大的国家,愿意毫不犹豫地使用武力来维护自己的利益”。大多数民主党人(85%)和独立选民(69%)支持第一种观点,而近六成的共和党人(57%)则支持第二种观点。

除了白人福音派新教徒(他们的观点各占49%和48%)外,所有宗教群体的大多数人更倾向于将美国视为一个可靠的邻国,而非一个强大的国家。

Foreign Policy United States as a Reliable Neighbor or Mighty Nation Less than two-thirds of Americans (64%) agree with the statement “I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that only uses military force as a last resort,” while around one-third agree with the statement “I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to defend its interests” (32%). Most Democrats (85%) and independents (69%) agree with the first statement, while nearly six in ten Republicans (57%) agree with the second statement.[8] Except for white evangelical Protestants, who are evenly divided (49% vs. 48%), majorities across all religious groups prefer the reliable neighbor over mighty nation framing.

在那些反对基督教民族主义的人中(88%),以及持怀疑态度的人中(69%),有近九成的人希望美国能成为一个可靠的邻国;而在支持基督教民族主义的人中,只有五成(53%)持这种观点;而在真正信奉基督教民族主义的人中,有四成(41%)希望美国能成为一个愿意使用武力来维护自身利益的强大国家。

Nearly nine in ten Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters (88%) and seven in ten Skeptics (69%) would prefer the U.S. to be a reliable neighbor, compared with a slim majority of Sympathizers (53%) and about four in ten Adherents (41%). The majority of Christian nationalism Adherents (58%) would prefer the U.S. to be a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to protect its interests.

特朗普的外交政策损害了与美国欧洲盟友的关系大多数美国人(63%)认为特朗普的外交政策严重损害了美国与其传统欧洲盟友之间的关系,而29%的人持相反观点。其中,近九成的民主党人(88%)和独立选民(70%)同意这一观点,而只有大约三分之一的共和党人(35%)持相同看法。

Trump’s Foreign Policy Has Damaged Relationships with European Allies A majority of Americans (63%) agree that Trump’s foreign policy has seriously damaged the United States’ relationships with its traditional European allies, while 29% disagree. Nearly nine in ten Democrats (88%) and seven in ten independents (70%) agree, compared with around one-third of Republicans (35%).

白人福音派新教徒是唯一一个认为特朗普的外交政策损害了美国与欧洲盟友关系的比例不足半数的宗教群体(41%)。其他非基督教宗教成员(77%)、黑人新教徒(77%)、无宗教归属的美国人(76%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(76%)中约有四分之三同意这一观点,犹太裔美国人(63%)、西班牙裔新教徒(63%)、白人主流/非福音派新教徒(61%)和白人天主教徒(60%)中约有六成同意,而耶稣基督后期圣徒教会成员(摩门教徒)中则有微弱多数(53%)同意。

White evangelical Protestants are the only religious group where less than half believe Trump’s foreign policy has damaged U.S. relationships with European allies (41%). About three-quarters of members of other non-Christian religions (77%), Black Protestants (77%), unaffiliated Americans (76%), and Hispanic Catholics (76%) agree, as well as six in ten Jewish Americans (63%), Hispanic Protestants (63%), white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (61%), and white Catholics (60%), and a slim majority of Latter-day Saints (53%).

在基督教民族主义“拒绝者”中,超过十分之九(92%)同意特朗普的外交政策严重损害了美国与欧洲盟友的关系,“怀疑者”中有七成(70%)同意,而“同情者”中约有一半(51%)和“追随者”中三分之一(34%)同意。

Over nine in ten Christian nationalism Rejecters (92%) and seven in ten Skeptics (70%) agree Trump’s foreign policy has seriously damaged the United States’ relationships with European allies, compared with about half of Sympathizers (51%) and one-third of Adherents (34%).

关于除非欧洲盟友增加国防开支否则减少对北约承诺的问题,大多数美国人(54%)同意美国应减少对北约的军事承诺,而四成(40%)不同意。四分之三的共和党人(77%)和微弱多数的独立人士(55%)同意减少对北约的承诺,相比之下,只有三分之一的民主党人(34%)同意。

Reducing Commitments With NATO Unless European Allies Spend More on Themselves Most Americans (54%) agree the United States should reduce its military commitments to NATO unless European allies spend more on their own defense, while four in ten disagree (40%). Three-quarters of Republicans (77%) and a slim majority of independents (55%) agree with reduced commitments to NATO, compared with one-third of Democrats (34%).

三分之二的白人福音派新教徒(68%)同意除非欧洲盟友为自身国防增加开支,否则美国应减少对北约的军事承诺,其他非基督教宗教成员(61%)、西班牙裔新教徒(60%)、后期圣徒教会成员(60%)和白人天主教徒(58%)中约有六成同意,白人主流/非福音派新教徒(55%)和西班牙裔天主教徒(53%)中有微弱多数同意。黑人新教徒(48%)和无宗教归属的美国人(46%)中同意者不足半数,犹太裔美国人中同意者为41%。

Two-thirds of white evangelical Protestants (68%) agree the U.S. should reduce its military commitments to NATO unless European allies spend more for their own defenses, as do six in ten members of other non-Christian religions (61%), Hispanic Protestants (60%), Latter-day Saints (60%), and white Catholics (58%), and slim majorities of white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (55%) and Hispanic Catholics (53%). Less than half of Black Protestants (48%) and unaffiliated Americans (46%), as well as 41% of Jewish Americans, also agree.

美国对伊朗的打击是正当的。近六成美国人(57%)不同意美国对伊朗实施军事打击是正当的说法,而超过三分之一的人认为美国的打击是正当的(36%)。共和党人(71%)认为美国对伊朗的打击是正当的比例是独立人士(32%)的两倍多,是民主党人(14%)的五倍。

The U.S. Was Justified in Strikes Against Iran Nearly six in ten Americans (57%) disagree that the United States was justified in carrying out military strikes against Iran, while more than one-third agree the U.S. was justified (36%). Republicans (71%) are more than twice as likely as independents (32%) and five times as likely as Democrats (14%) to believe the U.S. was justified in its strikes against Iran.

白人福音派新教徒(62%)的稳固多数和后期圣徒(54%)的微弱多数认为美国对伊朗的打击是正当,其次是不到半数的白人天主教徒(49%)、犹太裔美国人(46%)以及白人主流/非福音派新教徒(46%)。约三分之一的拉美裔新教徒(36%)以及其他非基督教宗教成员、黑人新教徒、拉美裔天主教徒和无宗教归属美国人各有23%表示同意。

A solid majority of white evangelical Protestants (62%) and a slim majority of Latter-day Saints (54%) agree the U.S. was justified in its strikes against Iran, followed by less than half of white Catholics (49%), Jewish Americans (46%), and white mainline/non-evangelical Protestants (46%). About one-third of Hispanic Protestants (36%) and 23% each of members of other non-Christian religions, Black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, and unaffiliated Americans also agree.

超过四成的年长美国人(50至64岁人群中42%,65岁及以上人群中43%)表示美国的行动是正当的,相比之下,30至49岁人群中持此看法的为三分之一(33%),18至29岁人群中为四分之一(26%)。

Over four in ten older Americans (42% of those ages 50-64 and 43% of those ages 65 and older) say the U.S. was justified, compared with one-third of those ages 30-49 (33%) and one-quarter of those ages 18-29 (26%).

美国向以色列提供过多支持。近三分之二的美国人(64%)认为美国向以色列提供了过多的财政和军事支持,相比之下三成的人不同意这一说法(30%)。民主党人(77%)和独立人士(68%)的多数表示同意,而共和党人在此问题上存在分歧(50%同意,46%不同意)。

The U.S. Provides Too Much Support to Israel Nearly two-thirds of Americans (64%) agree the United States provides too much financial and military support to Israel, compared with three in ten who disagree (30%). Majorities of Democrats (77%) and independents (68%) agree, while Republicans are split on the issue (50% agree vs. 46% disagree).

除白人福音派新教徒(43%)和犹太裔美国人(34%)外,各宗教群体的稳固多数都认为美国向以色列提供了过多支持。

With the exception of white evangelical Protestants (43%) and Jewish Americans (34%), solid majorities of each religious group agree the U.S. provides too much support to Israel.

当被问及以色列与巴勒斯坦之间持续的冲突时,大多数美国人表示,他们的同情心既不偏向以色列,也不偏向巴勒斯坦(38%),或者同时偏向这两个群体(16%)。美国人对以色列的同情略高于对巴勒斯坦的同情(22% 对 19%)。对以色列的同情已从 2024 年的 28% 下降,而对巴勒斯坦的同情则从 15% 略有上升。

Perceptions of the Conflict Between Israel and the Palestinians When asked about the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, most Americans say either that their sympathies do not lie with either Israel or the Palestinians (38%) or lie with both groups (16%). Americans have slightly higher sympathies for Israel than the Palestinians (22% vs. 19%). Sympathies for Israel have decreased from 28% in 2024, while sympathies for the Palestinians have increased slightly from 15%.

共和党人(48%)比无党派人士(18%)和民主党人(8%)更有可能表示他们的同情更偏向以色列人,而民主党人(33%)比无党派人士(20%)和共和党人(5%)更有可能表示他们的同情更偏向巴勒斯坦人;民主党人(20%)和无党派人士(18%)均比共和党人(10%)更有可能表示他们的同情同时偏向以色列人和巴勒斯坦人。

Republicans (48%) are more likely than independents (18%) and Democrats (8%) to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis, while Democrats (33%) are more likely than independents (20%) and Republicans (5%) to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians; both Democrats (20%) and independents (18%) are more likely than Republicans (10%) to say their sympathies lie with both the Israelis and the Palestinians.

犹太裔美国人(52%)和白人福音派新教徒(50%)引人注目,因为他们中有一半表示同情更偏向以色列人。其他白人基督教群体也更倾向于表示同情更偏向以色列人而非巴勒斯坦人。相比之下,有色人种基督徒、无宗教归属的美国人,以及自认信奉非基督教、非犹太教宗教的美国人,表示同情更偏向巴勒斯坦人。

Jewish Americans (52%) and white evangelical Protestants (50%) stand out in that half say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis. Other white Christian groups are also more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis than with the Palestinians. By contrast, Christians of color, religiously unaffiliated Americans, and Americans who identify with a non-Christian or non-Jewish religion say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians.

基督教民族主义 坚定信奉者(47%)比同情者(34%)、怀疑论者(21%)和拒绝者(5%)更有可能表示同情更偏向以色列人,而拒绝者(46%)比怀疑论者(14%)、同情者(7%)和坚定信奉者(5%)更有可能表示同情更偏向巴勒斯坦人。

Christian nationalism Adherents (47%) are more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Israelis than Sympathizers (34%), Skeptics (21%), and Rejecters (5%), while Rejecters (46%) are more likely to say their sympathies lie more with the Palestinians than Skeptics (14%), Sympathizers (7%), and Adherents (5%).

在以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突中的同情立场因年龄而存在显著分歧:在18至29岁的美国人中,仅有12%更同情以色列人,30至49岁人群中为15%,而50至64岁人群中为28%,65岁及以上人群中为35%。对巴勒斯坦人的同情则呈相反趋势,从最年轻美国人中的27%降至50岁及以上人群中的14%至16%。

Sympathy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict divides sharply by age: Sympathies lie more with the Israelis for just 12% of Americans ages 18-29 and 15% of Americans ages 30-49, compared with 28% among ages 50-64, and 35% among ages 65 and older. Sympathy for the Palestinians runs in the opposite direction, falling from 27% among the youngest Americans to 14-16% among those 50 and older.

控制外国领土以推进和增强国家实力:四分之三的美国人(75%)不同意美国应控制外国领土(如格陵兰或古巴),理由是这样做将推进美国利益并增强美国实力,相比之下仅有约两成的人同意(19%)。民主党人(88%)、独立人士(79%)和共和党人(62%)中的绝大多数均反对这一想法;三分之一的共和党人(35%)表示同意。所有宗教传统、基督教民族主义群体及其他关键人口群体中的多数人均不认同这类外交政策,其中反对比例最低的是基督教民族主义拥护者,为53%。

Taking Control of Foreign Territory to Advance and Strengthen the Country Three-fourths of Americans (75%) disagree that the United States should take control of foreign territory, such as Greenland or Cuba, because doing so would advance American interests and strengthen American power, compared with just two in ten who agree (19%). Solid majorities of Democrats (88%), independents (79%), and Republicans (62%) are against the idea; one-third of Republicans (35%) agree.

[1] 根据公共政策研究机构(PRRI)2024年的选举后调查结果,我们确定了那些大多数选民表示支持特朗普的选民群体。此外,为了衡量“基督教民族主义”这一现象,PRRI设计了一系列五个问题来评估受访者的态度:

Majorities of all religious traditions, Christian nationalism groups, and other key demographics disagree with type of foreign policy, with the lowest opposition coming from Christian nationalism Adherents at 53%.

  1. “美国政府应该将美国宣布为一个基督教国家”;

  2. “美国的法律应该基于基督教价值观”;

[1] We identified the groups in which a majority of voters reported voting for Trump based on PRRI’s 2024 Post-Election Survey.

  1. “如果美国背离其基督教根基,那么这个国家就不再存在了”;

In addition, to measure Christian nationalism, PRRI used a battery of five questions based on respondents’ answers to (1) The U.S. government should declare America a Christian nation, (2) U.S. laws should be based on Christian values, (3) If the U.S. moves away from our Christian foundations, we will not have a country anymore, (4) Being Christian is an important part of being truly American, and (5) God has called Christians to exercise dominion over all areas of American society.

  1. “作为基督徒是真正成为美国人的一部分”;

  2. “上帝赋予基督徒在美国社会的各个领域行使统治权的使命”。

Each respondent receives a composite score on the Christian nationalism scale (with a range of 0 to 1) and is then assigned to one of the four groups.

每位受访者都会根据这些问题的回答获得一个关于其基督教民族主义倾向的综合评分(评分范围为0到1),并据此被归入四个不同的群体之一。

如需了解更多关于这些评估方法以及基督教民族主义现象的详细信息,请参阅我们的先前报告:《一个基督教国家?——理解基督教民族主义对美国民主与文化的威胁》(“A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture”)、《全美50个州对基督教民族主义的支持情况:PRRI 2023年美国价值观地图集的调研结果》(“Support for Christian Nationalism in All 50 States: Findings from PRRI’s 2023 American Values Atlas”)、《全美50个州的基督教民族主义现象:PRRI 2024年美国价值观地图集的洞察》(“Christian Nationalism Across All 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas”),以及《全美50个州的基督教民族主义分布图:PRRI 2025年美国价值观地图集的解析》(“Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas”)。

For more information about how measures are constructed and Christian nationalism more generally, please see our previous reports: “A Christian Nation? Understanding the Threat of Christian Nationalism to American Democracy and Culture,” “Support for Christian Nationalism in All 50 States: Findings from PRRI’s 2023 American Values Atlas,” “Christian Nationalism Across All 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas,” and “Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas.” [2] Because this question was asked of a half sample in 2025, the sample sizes for Hispanic Protestants, Latter-day Saints, and non-Christians are too low to report.

[2] 由于该问题仅在2025年的调查中针对部分样本进行了询问,因此西班牙裔新教徒、后期圣徒(Latter-day Saints)以及非基督徒的样本数量太少,无法提供具体的统计数据。

[3] 在本报告中,我们采用了更新后的7点政党认同度分类方法,将那些尚未决定支持哪个政党或属于无党派人士的受访者归入“无党派”类别;同时,我们将那些自称为“其他”类别的受访者排除在外。

[3] For this report, we use an updated version of 7-point party identification to capture undecided and independents in the independent category, while excluding those who identify as “other.” [4] The number of cases of Hispanic Protestant voters in the 2024 election is too small to examine whether they are satisfied or regret their vote.

[4] 2024年选举中西班牙裔新教徒的选民数量实在太少,因此无法分析他们对自己投票结果的满意程度或后悔情绪。

[5] In previous years, respondents were asked to choose which of two issues they considered the bigger problem in U.S. elections: “people casting votes who are not eligible to vote” or “eligible voters being denied the right to vote.” [6] This question was asked for the first time in September 2025, with slightly different wording, as follows: the statements were worded as: “Statement 1: Empathy is a moral value that is the foundation of a healthy society. OR Statement 2: Empathy is a dangerous emotion that undermines our ability to set up society that is guided by God’s truth.”

[5] 往年,受访者被要求从两个问题中选择他们认为在美国选举中更严重的一个:“不具备投票资格的人参与投票”或“合格选民被剥夺投票权”。[6] 该问题于2025年9月首次提出,措辞略有不同,具体如下:两项陈述的措辞为:“陈述1:共情是一种道德价值,是健康社会的基础。或陈述2:共情是一种危险的情绪,会削弱我们建立一个以上帝真理为指导的社会的能力。”当时,绝大多数美国人同意第一种陈述(80%),其中包括90%的民主党人、83%的无党派人士和72%的共和党人。

At that time, solid majorities of Americans agreed with the first statement (80%), including 90% of Democrats, 83% of independents, and 72% of Republicans.

[7] 2018年底,PRRI就这一问题的一个变体进行了提问,衡量美国人在多大程度上支持“修改宪法,以防止在美国出生的非美国公民子女自动获得美国公民身份”。当时,多数美国人(52%)反对这一提议,而三分之二的共和党人(67%)支持该提议,相比之下,无党派人士为40%,民主党人为25%。

[7] At the end of 2018, PRRI asked a variation of this question, measuring the extent to which Americans favored “changing the Constitution to prevent children who are born in the United States to non-U.S. citizens from automatically being granted American citizenship.”At the time, a majority of Americans (52%) opposed this proposal, while two-thirds of Republicans (67%) favored it, compared with 40% of independents and 25% of Democrats.

[8] 该问题于2026年5月首次提出,措辞略有不同,具体如下:陈述1:我更希望美国被看作一个强大的国家,不惜使用军事力量来捍卫我们的利益;或陈述2:我更希望美国被看作一个可靠的邻居,与其他国家合作,仅将军事力量作为最后手段使用。

[8] This question was asked for the first time in May 2026, with slightly different wording, as follows: Statement 1: I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a mighty nation that does not hesitate to use military force to defend our interests; OR Statement 2: I would prefer the U.S. to be known as a reliable neighbor that cooperates with other nations and only uses military force as a last resort.

附录A. 调查方法 该调查由PRRI设计和实施。该调查得以完成,得益于安德鲁·卡内基基金会的慷慨支持,以及福特基金会和位于谢尔特罗克的普救一位神教韦奇项目的额外支持。

APPENDIX A. Survey Methodology The survey was designed and conducted by PRRI. The survey was made possible through the generous support of the Andrew Carnegie Foundation, with additional support from the Ford Foundation, and the Unitarian Universalist Veatch Program at Shelter Rock.

本次调查的对象是一个具有代表性的样本,包括居住在美国全部50个州的5200名成年人(18岁及以上),他们属于益普索知识面板的成员;此外还有339人,是益普索通过自愿参与式调查面板招募的,以增加较小州的样本量。访谈于2026年8月20日至9月7日期间在线进行。

The survey was conducted among a representative sample of 5,200 adults(age 18 and up) living in all 50 states in the United States, who are part of Ipsos’s KnowledgePanel and an additional 339 who were recruited by Ipsos using opt-in survey panels to increase the sample sizes in smaller states. Interviews were conducted online between August 20-September 7, 2026.

受访者是采用基于地址的抽样方法,从美国邮政署的投递序列文件中招募加入知识面板的——该数据库全面覆盖美国所有投递地址。因此,它覆盖所有家庭,无论其电话状况如何,从而提供具有代表性的在线样本。与自愿参与式面板不同,家庭不得“自行选择”加入该面板;并且他们在特定时间段内能参与的调查数量通常受到限制。

Respondents are recruited to the KnowledgePanel using an addressed-based sampling methodology from the Delivery Sequence File of the USPS – a database with full coverage of all delivery addresses in the U.S. As such, it covers all households regardless of their phone status, providing a representative online sample. Unlike opt-in panels, households are not permitted to “self-select” into the panel; and are generally limited to how many surveys they can take within a given time period.

从知识面板中抽取的初始样本经过预分层权重调整,使其接近美国成年人口。接下来,采用按规模比例概率(PPS)抽样方案来选取具有代表性的样本。

The initial sample drawn from the KnowledgePanel was adjusted using pre-stratification weights so that it approximates the adult U.S. population. Next, a probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling scheme was used to select a representative sample.

为减少任何无应答偏差的影响,我们进行了事后分层调整。所需的基准数据取自最新的2025年3月《当前人口调查》(CPS)增补数据,但语言熟练度除外,因为CPS不提供该数据,故取自2024年《美国社区调查》(ACS)。此外,2024年投票选择基准取自美联社认证结果统计表,党派归属基准取自2025年皮尤《全国公众舆论参考调查》(NPORS)。

To reduce the effects of any non-response bias, a post-stratification adjustment was applied. The needed benchmarks were obtained from the latest 2025 March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS), except language proficiency, which is not available from CPS, and was obtained from the 2024 American Community Survey (ACS). Additionally, the 2024 vote choice benchmark was obtained from the Associated Press Tabulation of Certified Results and party affiliation benchmark was obtained from the 2025 Pew’s National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS).

事后分层权重根据以下基准对样本进行了重新平衡:按年龄划分的性别、种族/族裔、教育程度、收入、语言熟练度、按都市地位划分的人口普查区域,以及2024年总统选举投票选择。此外,我们还纳入了各个州(50个州加上哥伦比亚特区),以计入对部分州的过度抽样。

The post-stratification weight rebalanced the sample based on the following benchmarks: gender by age, race/ethnicity, education, income, language proficiency, Census region by metropolitan status, and 2024 presidential vote choice. Additionally, we included individual states (50 states plus D.C.) to account for the oversampling of some states.

全国调查的误差范围为在95%置信水平下正负1.6个百分点,其中包含该调查1.48的设计效应。除抽样误差外,调查还可能因问题措辞、语境和顺序效应而存在误差或偏差。有关KnowledgePanel的更多详情,可在益普索(Ipsos)网站上查阅:

The margin of error for the national survey is +/- 1.6 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence, including the design effect for the survey of 1.48. In addition to sampling error, surveys may also be subject to error or bias due to question wording, context, and order effects. Additional details about the KnowledgePanel can be found on the Ipsos website:

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