Field Marshal Asim Munir, arrived in Tehran on Tuesday evening for talks with Iranian officials, as diplomatic efforts ramp up to prevent a new round of fighting with the United States and Israel.

Munir’s visit is his fifth to Iran since the April ceasefire between Tehran and Washington, which was brokered by Islamabad. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi is accompanying Munir, Iran’s state news agency IRNA reported.

The Pakistani army chief is expected to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi first, IRNA said. The visit comes a day after Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks in Tehran, and two weeks after Pakistan and its allies agreed to accelerate the deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia, which has come under repeated attacks from the Iran-backed Houthi armed group in Yemen.

Lavrov’s visit on Monday was his first to Tehran since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran in February. The Russian foreign minister met Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, and the talks covered the war, the Strait of Hormuz and efforts to end the fighting.

“The timing of [Munir’s] visit, following Lavrov’s presence in Tehran, suggests that Iran prefers to keep multiple diplomatic channels open, rather than relying exclusively on a single mediator,” Seyed Mojtaba Jalazadeh, a Tehran-based foreign policy analyst, told Al Jazeera.

But the Munir visit also comes at a time when some experts have warned of growing signs that United States President Donald Trump might be preparing for a return to fighting with Iran.

Trump rejected an Iranian proposal to end the war on September 26. Since then, the US has deployed an additional aircraft carrier to the Middle East, which is expected to arrive by late November. Trump has endorsed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel’s upcoming October 27 election, referring to their shared mission in attacking Iran. Trump said that if Netanyahu were not re-elected, the US would need to attack Iran on its own.

Analysts say these developments add urgency to diplomatic efforts to sidestep a potential military escalation. In recent weeks, Qatar has played a key role in channeling proposals between the US and Iran. Andreas Krieg, an associate professor in security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that while Qatar increasingly provides the diplomatic machinery behind the talks, Doha still values Islamabad’s access to Washington and Tehran.

“Pakistan offers political access, particularly through Field Marshal Asim Munir, while Qatar does much of the detailed negotiating,” Krieg said.

The Islamabad MoU Pakistan has mediated between Washington and Tehran since the US and Israel began striking Iran on February 28.

A roadside billboard displaying portraits of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, following a deal between the US and Iran, in Islamabad, Pakistan, June 16, 2026. [Akhtar Soomro/Reuters] Islamabad brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and, days later, hosted the highest-level direct engagement between the US and Iran since 1979. In June, the two sides agreed to a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MoU).

Under the agreement, the US was to lift its naval blockade within 30 days, the Strait of Hormuz was to reopen, and about $24bn in estimated frozen Iranian assets was to be released in phases over 60 days of further talks, including negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme.

That period expired in mid-August without either side agreeing to extend it. Iran says the US failed to meet its commitments, and Tehran has kept the Strait of Hormuz closed, insisting that Washington first lift the blockade. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has continued to point to the agreement and its utility.

“The Islamabad MoU is already in place, and some of the points currently under discussion are fully aligned with it,” spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan told a weekly briefing on October 9.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said on October 2 that Iran’s seven-day plan was drawn from the MoU. Analysts, however, disagree on whether the agreement can still provide a basis for negotiations.

“On the Islamabad MoU, I think it’s done from both sides and perhaps a new mechanism is required to start negotiations,” Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, told Al Jazeera.

Krieg said that while the Islamabad MoU was “politically alive”, it was “operationally dead”. “The circumstances under which it was signed have fundamentally changed,” he said.

But Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, said the agreement could still be used.

“The Islamabad MoU remains usable, even if the political and security environment has deteriorated,” he told Al Jazeera. “It is still the minimum agreed benchmark between Washington and Tehran, and neither side has an obvious alternative framework for addressing the issues related to maritime access, sanctions relief and nuclear talks.”

Pakistan’s Saudi commitment Meanwhile, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7.

It was Pakistan’s second defence pact with Saudi Arabia, after the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement the two countries signed in September 2025.

At an emergency meeting in Riyadh on October 5, the three countries agreed to expedite the deployment of forces and capabilities under the pact.

Within days, Houthi missiles and drones struck Riyadh’s King Khalid international airport more than once, as well as targets in Abha, Yanbu and Shaybah.

Lieutenant-General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the Pakistani military’s spokesman, discussed the defence pact and the importance of protecting holy sites in Mecca and Medina in an interview with Independent Arabia on October 18.

“The security of the Harmain Sharifain is paramount. It’s non-negotiable,” he said, referring to Islam’s two holiest mosques. “Whatever support is needed to do that is being provided and will be provided.”He declined to provide details, citing operational confidentiality.

Chaudhry said Pakistan wanted a negotiated end to the conflict. “If we are unable to come to a negotiated outcome and we turn into a military conflict, then this collective deterrence, this instrument of collective deterrence of Mecca Alliance will definitely come into play, as it is coming into play,” he said.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (R), Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman and Pakistani deputy foreign minister Ishaq Dar attend a meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee, established under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on October 5, 2026. [Mustafa Hatipoğlu/Anadolu Agency] Asked at the October 9 briefing whether Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia would engage the Houthis, Foreign Office spokesman Khan said they would not. “These forces would not cross the border into Yemen to launch attacks against the Houthis,” he said.

On Monday, a day before leaving for Tehran, Munir met Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Rajeh Tami Albugamy. A statement said the two expressed satisfaction with progress under the pact, but made no mention of the Houthis or Iran.

Tehran’s public response to the agreement has largely been restrained. On October 11, Araghchi told his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan, that Tehran was ready to provide “any possible assistance” to start a dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, IRNA reported. Saudi state media said that the two only discussed the “recent escalation in violence in the region”.

After meeting Iranian leaders in New York last month, Dar said they had told him Iran had nothing to do with the Houthis and had suggested engaging them politically rather than militarily. But Krieg said Pakistan’s two roles were becoming harder to reconcile.

“Pakistan remains an important intermediary, but its credibility as a neutral actor is increasingly compromised by its security commitments to Saudi Arabia,” he said. Jalazadeh said Tehran’s concern was more limited.

“Iran does not necessarily perceive stronger defence cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as an immediate threat, but it does regard it as a complicating and constraining factor,” he said.

Mixed signals from Washington But it’s not just Pakistan facing competing pressures — or sending seemingly mixed signals. In Washington, Trump has pledged not to strike Iran before the US midterm elections.

US President Donald Trump speaks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, in Jerusalem on October 13, 2025. [AFP]“We will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the US on November 3rd,” he wrote on his Truth Social platform on October 8. In the same post, he said the US was having productive discussions with Iran. The naval blockade has remained in place.

Ten days later, though, Trump endorsed Netanyahu. “If Israel has the wrong Leader, which would be anyone other than Bibi, America will have to do this work ourselves, and I am not inclined to do so,” Trump wrote.

On Monday, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met Netanyahu at Ovda airbase in southern Israel during an unannounced visit, Axios reported. The outlet said the visit came amid US-Israeli discussions about potentially resuming major combat operations against Iran.

“Threats of military strikes, combined with the blockade and indirect negotiations, undermine Iran’s confidence in Washington’s intentions and make stronger security guarantees one of the central issues in any potential agreement,” Jalazadeh said.

Faisal told Al Jazeera that the timing of the two votes, a week apart, made major concessions difficult for both sides and raised the risk of escalation.

Krieg said the elections were among the strongest constraints on another major war, but warned that the risk could grow once they had passed.

“The immediate danger is that Iran overplays its hand,” he said. “A major attack causing American casualties could override electoral calculations altogether.”